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Declarations of Rights
JEREMY ELKINS

We do need history... we need it for life and action, not as a convenient way to avoid life and action.
-Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History'
What does it mean for a sovereign people to live under a written constitution of rights? This is the general question with which I shall be concerned in
the following pages. Let me begin by saying something, first, about the significance of the form in which I have put this question, and, secondly, about
the particular context within which I shall want to pursue it.
During the last several decades, an extended debate has taken place in the
United States on the question of how to understand the meaning of a written
constitution, and particularly a written constitution of rights. The amount of
scholarly attention that has been devoted to the issue has been enormous and
the literature that has been produced has been rich and in some ways quite
varied. And yet in an important respect, the discussion has proceeded within
a remarkably narrow frame: in general, the question of how to understand a
written constitution of rights has been conceived as essentially a question of
interpretation-of how to read a text, or how to read a legal text or how to
read a constitutional text. Conceptually prior, however, to the question of how
we should interpret a written constitution of rights (or what it would mean to
interpret it, or even whether what we should be doing is interpreting it) must,
of course, be the question of what such a constitution is; and that question-of how to regard, as a matter of democratic theory, the constitution
under which we live--cannot itself be a purely interpretive one.2 Interpretive
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article grew out of a paper delivered at the conference on "Constitutions and 'Survivor
Stories'" held at the University of California, Santa Cruz in January, 1995. He would like
to thank the organizers of the conference, Robert Meister and Wendy Brown, for the
invitation to give a paper. He would also like to thank Bradley Bugdanowitz of the
Roundtable for his comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History 3 (Liberal Arts, 1957) (Adrian
Collins, trans).
2. On a broad enough view of "interpretation," any theory of a written constitution
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theories may simply rest on the assumption that we have already satisfactorily
answered the question of what a written constitution of rights is, and that the
answer is such that the remaining questions are all questions about interpretation. The discussion that follows, however, proceeds from the belief that we
have not satisfactorily answered the question of how we ought to understand
such a constitution; and in the next section, I shall describe the traditional
answer and indicate why it is neither obvious nor satisfactory.
The general project of this essay, then, is to re-examine the idea of a
written constitution of rights. And in posing the question in the form that I
have-what does it mean for a sovereign people to live under a written constitution of rights?-my point is to fix attention on the constitutionalist nature
of the problem. Two fundamental principles of modern constitutionalism are
that ultimate political authority lies with "the people" and that governmental
power is limited. But a central issue for modern constitutionalist thought is of
the relationship between these principles. If the power of the state rests on the
authority of the people, on what basis can governmental power be limited, and
what is the nature of that limitation? What is the relationship between the
sovereign people, on whose authority the state rests, and the government,
whose power is limited? It is from the standpoint of these constitutionalist
questions that I shall want to explore the notion of a written constitution of
rights. If a written constitution of rights limits governmental power, on what
basis does it do so, and what is the nature of that limitation? How shall we
understand the relationship between a written constitution of rights, the
sovereign people and institutions of government? And what is the significance,
in a constitutional charter founded on the authority of "the people," of
declaring rights?
I shall want o explore these questions by returning to the moment in
which written constitutional charters grounded on the authority of the people
and containing declarations of rights first made their appearance-in the
American constitutional founding.3 My purpose in returning to this moment
and to these charters is not, however, to rest an argument on the authority of
history or on the intentions of the constitutional framers-and admittedly, I
shall be focussing on only certain strands of thought and certain aspects of
these constitutions. Rather, I shall want to return to the American founding

of rights could, no doubt, be represented as a theory of interpretation. But the effect of
framing the issue as one of interpretation has, in fact, been a tendency to neglect, at least
as an object of explicit consideration, the fundamental question of the idea of a written
constitution of rights, and of what it means to live under such a constitution.
3. I shall use the term "American founding" in the singular to refer, not to a single
moment in time, but to the process of founding the American constitutional orders,
including the federal constitutional order brought into being by the charter of 1787. I
shall also, for the purpose of simplicity, use the term "people" in the singular (as the
Declaration of Rights, for example, does), even though the state charters were obviously
founded on the authority of thirteen different "peoples." There is nothing that hangs on
these terms and we might just as well refer to the "American foundings" and "peoples."
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because, as I shall suggest, the American founding raised in a particularly
poignant way the fundamental constitutionalist problem of the relationship
between the sovereign people and institutions of government. And as I shall
suggest, the revolutionary American charters and their declarations of rights,
which grew (in part) out of an appreciation of this very immediate problem,
embody a set of important constitutionalist ideas about the relationship
between "the people" and intitutions of government, and about the role of a
written constitution of rights in a state founded on the authority of the
people-ideas that deserve to be taken far more seriously than they have been
in contemporary constitutional thought.
I shall focus on these revolutionary constitutional charters specifically
against the background of two general questions or sets of issues that, I shall
argue, came together in the American founding. The first of these, which was
raised directly by the act of founding itself, was the question of what it means
to establish a state on the authority of the sovereign people. The declaration
of independence from Great Britain was quite explicitly made in the name of
"the people," and both the revolutionary state constitutional charters and the
federal charter of 1787 were explicitly and self- consciously founded on the
authority of "the sovereign people." As such, the founding of new constitutional orders presented an immediate and fundamental question. For on the
one hand, the act of founding was itself an expression of the sovereignty and
the power of the people to "institute new government, laying its foundations
on such principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness." 4 And yet on the other
hand, the object of the founding was to create particular institutions that
would themselves represent the people. The question thus raised was how to
represent a people that was in some sense superior to the institutions that were
to be created.
The question of how to represent "the sovereign" people, and of the
relationship between "the people," and particular institutions of government,
converged, as I shall argue, with a second set of issues that had been at the
heart of the conflict between the colonies and Britain and that concerned the
nature of political authority, and the relationship between representation and
sovereignty. These issues require a far more lengthy treatment and they are the
subject of the extended historical discussion of Section II. As I shall discuss
there, for the American colonists, the question of political authority had always
been a complex one and the domains of political authority multiple and
overlapping. And from the point of view of the colonists, the threat to
political freedom came precisely in the claim of the center to complete authority over the colonies, and particularly-in the years preceding the American
revolution-from the claim of Parliament to perfect sovereignty over the whole
of the empire. For the colonists, then, the events of the years preceding the
American revolution presented in sharp form a conflict between just represen-

4. Declarationof Independence, paragraph 2.
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tation and political sovereignty; and colonial advocates during these years
consistently denied the claims of Parliamentary sovereignty over the colonies
precisely on the grounds that such sovereignty violated the colonial right to
proper representation. The eventual response to the threat of political domination by Parliament was, of course, the declaring of independence; but the
founding of independent states did not eliminate the general danger that the
former colonists knew only too well: the danger that a particular institution,
although not in fact fully representative, would claim complete sovereign
power. This problem thus gave particular force, and shape, to the question
presented by the act of founding a state on the authority of the sovereign
people. In short, the issue presented was how to create institutions that would
represent the sovereign people without themselves assuming a kind of sovereignty.
I shall want to examine the revolutionary constitutional charters, and
particularly their declarations of rights, specifically as responses to these
questions and to these sets of issues. And I shall suggest that, understood in
this light, these charters can be seen to represent an important conception of
what a written constitution of rights is, and of the place of such a constitution
in a state founded on the authority of the sovereign people. As I shall emphasize, the ideas embodied within these charters were hardly fully developed or
theorized-they were as much as anything instincts and tendencies implicit in
practice and early movements of thought-and they are certainly in need of
elaboration and extension. The essential issue for us, however, is not whether
they had a well-developed constitutional theory, but whether there is something
of importance in their constitutional ideas, instincts and practices that is worth
pursuing. I shall suggest that, indeed, there is; that in these early constitutional
ideas, practices and instincts lies a significant, but largely neglected, contribution to constitutionalist thought, and an important foundation for thinking, or
re-thinking, the idea of a written constitution of rights.
I
The dominant American understanding of what it means to live under a
written constitution has its official roots in John Marshall's opinion for the
Supreme Court in Marbury v Madison. Marbury is, of course, commonly read
for its holding that courts have the power to review the constitutionality of
acts of government. But beneath Marbury's specific arguments for the power
of judicial review lies a more fundamental claim about the nature of the
Constitution itself. On the Marbury view, there are two essential characteristics
of the Constitution. The first is that the Constitution is supreme because it
represents the fundamental "will" of "the people":
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future
government, such principles, as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to
their own happiness is the basis on which the whole American fabric has
been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion;
nor can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated. The principles,
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therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the authority
from which they proceed is supreme, and can seldom act, they are
designed to be permanent.
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns
to different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here,
or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.
The government of the United States is of the latter description.'
The second characteristic of the Constitution, according to Marbury, is
that this fundamental will of the people is an enacted law.
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,
and, consequently, the theory of every such government must be, that an
act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.6
The power of the judiciary to determine ultimately what the Constitution
means and to deny effect to governmental actions that violate the meaning of
the Constitution simply follows, on the Marbury account, from this idea that
the Constitution is a supreme law.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must
of necessity expound and interpret that rule ...
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution

. . .

the court must

determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. 7

Underlying Marbury's particular arguments for judicial review is thus a
very definite understanding of the relationship between the sovereign people
and a written constitution, and a very definite conception of what a written
constitution is. On this account, the sovereign people expresses its sovereignty
through its "fundamental will" and that will is the Constitution as a law. It
is because the Constitution is the will of the sovereign people embodied as law

5. Marbury z; Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
6. Marbury, 5 US at 176-77.
7. Id at 177-78. Crucial portions of Marshall's argument in Marbury appeared earlier
in Hamilton's Federalist 78:
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A
constitution is, in fact, and must be, regarded by the judges as a fundamental law.
It must therefore belong to them to ascertain its meaning.
Max Beloff, ed, The Federalist or, The New Constitution 395, 398 (Basil Blackwell, 2d
ed 1987). The same argument was made by James Wilson in his Lectures on Law,
delivered in 1790-91 and published in 1804. Robert McCloskey, ed, 1 The Works of
James Wilson 329-331 (Harvard, 1967). While Marshall's arguments had been made earlier
by others, part of the significance of Marbury was how broadly the power of judicial
review was made to extend. For the dispute in that case hardly involved what could be
said to have been an obvious or gross violation of the Constitution, nor did it involve a
legislative intrusion into an area traditionally within the purview of courts.
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that debates about the meaning of the Constitution (in contrast to debates
about amending the Constitution) must ultimately be about interpretation-about discovering the meaning of this will. And indeed, because this is
a claim about the nature of the Constitution, it is not just an argument about
what it means for judges to decide constitutional questions, but about what it
must be for anyone properly to deliberate on the meaning of a written
constitution. We are not all judges, but when we engage in constitutional
debate, what we are doing (if we are doing it properly) is, on this understanding, interpreting the meaning of this fundamental will embodied in the
Constitution. In fact, Marshall asserts, it is the very sine qua non of a written
constitution that its meaning can, at bottom, be known as a matter of interpretation.
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution ...
[The alternative] reduces to nothing what we have deemed 8 the
greatest improvement on political institutions, a written constitution.
Although Marbury was specifically concerned with a provision of Article
III, this conception of the Constitution as a supreme law which embodies the
fundamental will of the people and whose meaning is given ultimately as a
matter of interpretation has become the basic model for understanding written
constitutions in general, and the basic model for thinking about constitutional
rights. Thus, constitutional rights are also typically understood as fundamental
laws whose authority derives from their having been enacted by "the people,"
and whose meaning is to be determined as a matter of interpretation. The
question of just how to interpret a written constitution has been the subject of
great dispute, but most of the major positions in the contemporary American
debate over constitutional meaning have adopted some form of the Marbury
view of constitutions. This is obviously true of so-called "textualism" (of
which there are, at least in its pure form, few adherents), which holds that the
meaning of a constitution is given by the plain words or the structure of the
document, and "strict constructionism," which holds that the meaning of a
constitution is given by the narrow intentions of the "framers." But the
primary alternative, what might be called "broad interpretivism,"-of which
there are, as with strict constructivism and textualism, quite a number of
different versions-also holds onto the basic premise of Marbury that constitutional judgments are fundamentally questions of interpretation. Broad
interpretivists often rely on something like the Dworkinian distinction between
"concepts" and "conceptions" 9 and insist that proper interpretation of the

8. Marbury, 5 US at 177-178.
9. Ronald Dworkin's first statement of the difference between concepts and conceptions was in Taking Rights Seriously:
Suppose a group believes in common that acts may suffer from a special moral
defect which they call unfairness, and which consists in a wrongful division of
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Constitution involves applying the framers' general concepts, rather than their
more narrow conceptions. But ultimately, broad interpretivists are
interpretivists, and the point of broad interpretivism is to show how the
particular meaning, of the Constitution, as-in those memorable words of high
school civics texts-a "living document," can change with the times, while still
being an interpretation of the "original and supreme will" of the people
enacted as a fundamental law.'"

benefits and burdens, or a wrongful attribution of praise or blame. Suppose also
that they agree on a great number of standard cases of unfairness ....
If so, then
members of this community who give instructions or set standards in the name of
fairness may be doing two different things. First they may be appealing to the
concept of fairness . . . ; in this case they charge those whom they instruct with
the responsibility of developing and applying their own, conception of fairness as
controversial cases arise ....
On the other hand, the members may be laying down
a particular conception of fairness ....
Once this distinction is made it seems obvious that we must take what I have been calling 'vague' constitutional clauses as
representing appeals to the concepts they employ. . . . The Supreme Court may
soon decide, for example, whether capital punishment is 'cruel' within the meaning
of the constitutional clause that prohibits 'cruel and unusual punishment.' It would
be a mistake for the Court to be much influenced by the fact that when the clause
was adopted capital punishment was standard and unquestioned. That would be
decisive if the framers of the clause had meant to lay down a particular conception
of cruelty, because it would show that the conception did not extend so far. But it
is not decisive of the different question the Court now faces, which is this: Can the
Court, responding to the framers' appeal to the concept of cruelty, now defend a
conception that does not make death cruel?
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 135-36 (Harvard, 1977). Robert Bennett makes
a similar argument in Objectivity in Constitutional Law 132 U Pa L Rev 456 (1984); and
David Richards, for example, argues that the real meaning of the Constitution is to be
found by applying the general concept of "human rights" that it lays down. David
Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in
Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution 30 Hastings L J 957, 960 (1979).
10. It is important to be clear about what is meant by the idea of "interpretation"
here, and no small amount of mischief has been caused by a slippage in the use of that
term. The term "interpretation" is sometimes used in a relatively loose sense to refer to
a kind of creative adaption in which one starts from a principle, or a practice, or a work
of art, etc. and develops it further, or modifies it, building in some way upon the original,
and in which the relation of the new to the old might naturally be described in such
terms as "developing out of," "inspired by" or "giving meaning to." Robert Cover, for
example, who is not a constitutional "interpretivist" in the sense used here, often uses the
term "interpretation" in this way. See Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv L Rev 4 (1983); Robert Cover, Violence
and the Word 95 Yale L J 1601 (1986). Both articles are reprinted in Martha Minow,
Michael Ryan and Austin Sarat, eds, Narrative, Violence and the Law: The Essays of
Robert Cover (Michigan, 1993). But the term "interpretation" can be, and often is, used
in a different and stronger sense, in which the goal of interpretation is understood to be
discerning or articulating an implicit meaning of the thing itself. It is easy to slide between
these two uses because in each case, there can be differences of judgment and because in
each case, the interpretation itself can add something to the original (in the latter case
because some aspect of the original thing is now made explicit.) Nonetheless, there is a
crucial difference between these two senses of "interpretation" and we normally distinguish
between them-although obviously what is called an "interpretation" may well involve
aspects of each of these. So, for example, if someone were to commend Apocalypse Now
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The idea that a sovereign people lives under, and in its normal politics is
beholden to, and regulated by, a listing of rights two centuries old which
represents the will of "those who have framed [the] written constitution[]" and
whose meaning is to be ascertained (as far as possible) from within the thing
itself is, nonetheless, a strange one, and it is stranger yet that such an idea has
become an article of faith for us." At least part of our willingness to suspend
disbelief in such an idea, or at least to continue in public to profess allegiance
to it, no doubt comes from accepting Marshall's assertion that such a notion
is "essentially attached to a written constitution" and that giving up this idea
would "reduce . . . to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement

on political institutions, a written constitution." It may be thought, that is,
that our only choice is to accept the conception of a written constitution of
rights as a fundamental law whose force comes from its having been enacted
by "the people" at some privileged historical moment, or to abandon the idea

as an interpretation of Heart of Darkness, it would be quite beside the point to respond
that the film was not a good interpretation because of all the ways in which the film
might have stayed closer to the original text. On the other hand, if a man leaves a living
will that instructs his family to cease life support when the prognosis for recovery is
"hopeless," the obligation of the family in interpreting the will is to discern what he
meant by "hopeless," and in this case a suggestion that the family has engaged in creative
interpretation would not be meant as a compliment. The difference between these two
senses of interpretation is not in whether the interpretation can be mechanically performed
or in whether there can be reasonable differences of interpretation. Both cases involve
judgments and in both cases reasonable people may disagree. The difference is that in the
second case, the standards of what would count as the best interpretation are, in principle,
given by that which is itself the object of interpretation-whether that is understood to be
the intention of the speaker, the text of a story, etc. Broad interpretivists sometimes slide,
with great effect, between these two senses of "interpretation." But in the end, most broad
interpretivists, while pointing to the open-ended texture of some provisions of the
Constitution, seem to stand on the idea that what courts ought to be doing when they
"interpret" a written constitution is, to the extent possible, determining the answer
according to some set of standards given by the thing itself. (Of course, an interpretivist
of any sort may well acknowledge that there are limits to what can be decided by
interpretation, but that is a different question.) Indeed, most interpretivists, strict or broad,
seem to accept that the authority of judges to issue binding constitutional pronouncements
at all comes precisely from the fact that-to the extent feasible-what they are doing is
interpreting in this second sense.
On the early use of the language of a "living constitution," see Justice Holmes's
opinion in Missouri v Holland, 252 US 416 (1920) and H. McBain, The Living Constitution (Macmillan, 1927), cited by William Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution,
54 Tex L Rev 693, 694.
11. The Constitution provides, of course, for its own amendment. And the nature of
the amendment procedure may be relevant to how we understand the force of the constitution; for the easier it is to amend the Constitution, the stronger the claim may be,
ceteris paribus, that the present constitution reflects present convictions. But the U.S.
Constitution is extraordinarily difficult to amend, a fact about it which is often thought
(rightly in my view) to be a virtue. Given the difficulty of amendment, however, the mere
possibility of amendment leaves open the basic issue of what force the existing Constitution should be thought to have and why.
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of a written constitution of rights entirely.
I shall suggest, however, that this is not so. I shall be particularly concerned here with the question of declarations of rights, although I shall say
something about written constitutions more generally. And I shall argue that
there is indeed another, and more promising, possibility available for thinking
about what it means to live under a written constitution of rights. I shall
suggest, moreover, that this conception of a written constitution of rights was
present, if not fully developed, within revolutionary American thought, and
that it grew out of the constitutional conflicts that led to the American
Revolution, and out of the very immediate problem raised by that revolution
of what it would mean to establish a state on the authority of a sovereign
people.
II

In May of 1776, the Continental Congress, declaring that it was "necessary that the exercise of every kind of authority under the said crown should
be totally suppressed," recommended to all those colonies in which "no
government sufficient to the exigencies of their affairs shall have hitherto been
established" that they "adopt such Government as shall, in the Opinion of the
Representatives of the People, best conduce to the Happiness and Safety of
their Constituents in particular and America in general."" Although the
Congress would not formally declare independence for another two months,
the May resolution, calling for the creation of constitutional orders "under the
authority of the people of the colonies,"" was a kind of precursory declaration of independence, a "Machine," (in the words of James Duane from the
New York delegation) "for the fabrication of Independence." 4 For it was,
with that resolution, apparent that these polities "were to be considered as no
longer colonies but states"; and this "transmutation of colonies into totally
self-governing commonwealths" was, indeed, "the heart of the Revolution as

a practical fact.""
The new political orders were brought into being by the adoption of
constitutional charters. These charters proclaimed the right of the people to
form governments, established various governmental bodies and specified their
power within the new constitutional system, declared the mode of election or
appointment to office, and provided for various other basic governmental
operations. As a matter of constitutional theory, there are several aspects of
these frameworks of government that are significant and that I shall touch
upon later. But my primary concern here will be with another feature of these

12. Willi Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions 61 (North Carolina, 1980).
13. Adams, First American Constitutions at 61 (cited in note 12).
14. L.H. Butterfield, et al, eds, 2 Diary and Autobiography of John Adams 386 (Harvard, 1961), quoted in id.
15. Andrew C. McLaughlin, A Constitutional History of the United States 99

(Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1935).
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charters. In addition to establishing the basic organization of governmental
bodies, most of these state charters also contained some listing of rights,
whether within the body of the document or as a separate declaration. Why?
What is the point of declaring rights within a constitutional charter founded
on the sovereignty of the people? What was the relationship between these
declarations,'" the sovereign people, and the governmental institutions that the
charters established?
To try to answer these questions, I shall want to examine these charters
as a response to the problem of establishing a state on the authority of the
sovereign people. And, as I shall suggest, the particular understanding of that
problem for the founding generation was shaped to an important extent by the
constitutional conflicts between the colonists and Great Britain which culminated in the American Revolution. It is these conflicts which are the subject of
this section.
Ultimately, I shall want to focus on the conflicts between Great Britain
and the colonists in the years immediately preceding the American Revolution.
Those conflicts, however, had deep roots, and in the first part of this Section
(Sections IIA and IIB) I shall want to explore two of these (interconnected)
roots. The first was a longstanding dispute between the center 7 and the
colonists about where ultimate political authority over the colonies lay. This
dispute, which began virtually with the establishment of the earliest settlements, is the subject of Section IIA. In several crucial respects, the constitutional controversies in the years preceding the American Revolution were rooted
as well, however, in the seventeenth century contests between Parliament and
king. The eventual institutional consequence of those contests was the supremacy of Parliament within the realm-and in the view of Parliament, within the
whole of the empire. But to Parliament's claim of sovereignty, the colonists
responded with an assertion of a fundamental constitutional right to just
representation; and that claim, and the conception of representation that it
entailed, was also partly an outgrowth of the seventeenth century battles. In
Section IIB, I shall take a detour, then, from the discussion of the controversy
between the center and the colonies to explore the nature of the seventeenth
century English constitutional contest, the idea of representation that was given
expression during that contest, and the conception of Parliament as an institution that grew out of it. In the light of this background, I shall then, in Section IIC, turn to the conflict between the colonies and the center as it emerged
in the years immediately prior to the American Revolution. And in the brief
Section IID and in the course of my discussion in Section III, I shall suggest
how the conflicts of the colonial period helped to raise, in a particularly

16. I shall use the term "declarations of rights" to refer to the listings of rights within
these charters, whether set out separately or within the body of the charter.
17. The convenient term "center" to refer to the realm or the metropolis (and represented variously by crown officials and Parliament) is taken from Jack P. Greene,
Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British
Empire and the United States, 1607-1788 (Norton, 1986).
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profound form, the problem of what it means to establish a state on the
authority of a sovereign people.
I shall return to the charters in Section I, and I shall there examine these
charters, and particularly their declarations of rights, as a response to this
fundamental problem. In Section IV, I shall conclude by summarizing what I
take to be the central contributions of these charters for constitutionalist
thought and by suggesting, in general terms, the relevance of these ideas for
our own constitutional thought and for specific practices such as judicial review.
A
At the heart of the conflict between Britain and the American colonies in the
years leading up to the Revolution was a dispute over the nature of the British
constitution and of the status of the American colonies within it. But while these
years saw a dramatic intensification of the constitutional dispute, the dispute was
hardly a new one; indeed, the nature of political authority over the colonies had
been a matter of contention from virtually the moment of their establishment.
On the view of crown officials, and later of Parliament, all political authority
flowed from the top downward and ultimate political authority remained in the
center. The colonists did not deny the idea that political authority flowed from
above, but neither did they accept it as the whole of the matter. Within the
colonies, there had also existed from the early colonial period onward a second
understanding of constitutional authority, in which authority flowed from the
bottom up; and for the colonists the relationship between these two sources of
authority was never simple. Similarly, the question of the division of authority
between the center and local institutions-an issue that was related to, but not
just the same thing as, the issue of the relationship between top-down and
bottom-up authority-was, for the colonists a complex one. In the colonial
conception, local and central power overlapped and the precise nature of the
power of each remained somewhat ambiguous. For most of American colonial
history, the colonists' and the center's competing views of political authority
existed in a state of rough, and not always peaceful, co-existence. At times, the
tension between the center and the colonies over the nature of the constitutional
order was quite pronounced; at times, more subdued. But the friction between
them, however well-managed, was never entirely absent.
Legally, the first American colonies were born into the world as the creature
of trading company charters. These charters, which offered the crown a convenient means of raising money and an opportunity to increase trade in raw materials for the realm without the need for an expensive centralized apparatus,
granted to the recipients rights to land in the New World and provided in very
general language for the establishment and administration of settlements. The
first Virginia Company charter in 1606 established a form of royal governance,
but beginning with the amended Virginia charter of 1609, the crown simply
delegated to the companies the power to govern, so long as regulations were
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"not contrary to the Laws and Statutes of... England.""8 It was the proprietors of these companies who, for a variety of reasons-to attract settlers from
England, to govern more effectively overseas colonies, and in some cases for idealistic reasons-first granted to settlers some of the "same privileges that" they
themselves "enjoyed ... that of gathering the 'generality' into an assembly for
the making of wholesome laws and ordinances pertaining to the safety and
welfare of the colony." 19
In 1624, the Virginia charter was revoked, making Virginia the first royal
colony, and the question was presented to crown officials of what to do with the
assembly that the company had authorized six years previous. For whatever
reason-no doubt, in part from of a recognition of the difficulties in governing
a far-away colony, perhaps from a desire to meet the wishes of the colonists and
perhaps from simple apathy-the decision was made to retain the assembly; and
in doing so, the crown established the model for what would be the basic
internal governing structure of royal colonies: a royally appointed governor and
council and a popular assembly. 2 During the course of colonial history, most
colonies would find themselves at one time or another existing as royal colonies,
but aside from the brief experiment in centrally governing the colonies under the
Dominion of New England from 1684-89, the crown would not attempt to
govern without representative assemblies. (And from 1632 on, proprietary
charters would include provision for governance by the lord or lords proprietor
with the "advice, assent and approbation of the freemen" or some similar
phrase.)
From the point of view of the crown, none of this amounted to a recognition
of any sort of colonial right to self-government. Constitutionally, the colonies
were created from above and existed for the purposes for which they had been
formed-to serve the interests of their proprietors and the realm. In governing
the colonies, the proprietors might allow for the establishment of assemblies, but
the proprietors could not change the constitutional status of the colonies. And

18. Benjamin Perley Poore, ed, 2 The Federal and State Constitutions, Charters and
Other Organic Laws of the United States 1905 (GPO, 2d ed 1878). The language differed
somewhat in subsequent charters. See, for example, id at 925, 941.
19. Charles M. Andrews, The Colonial Background of the American Revolution 32
(Yale, 1931).
In Massachusetts, the establishment of popular assemblies took a different route.
Like the Virginia Company charter, the Massachusetts Bay Company charter was a
trading-company charter, but the Massachusetts Bay Company quite quickly distinguished
itself from other trading companies by moving its charter from England to Massachusetts-unlike the Virginia charter, the Massachusetts charter did not require the company
to meet in England-and soon thereafter began to admit all church members into the
corporation. The early government of the colony was dominated by the governor and
assistants, but in 1634, and on the basis of their reading of the charter, a group of
freemen protested this oligarchical structure and demanded a system of representation for
all freemen. For a fuller account of these events, see Andrew McLaughlin, The Foundations of American Constitutionalism 41-44 (New York, 1932).
20. Andrews, Colonial Background at 33-34 (cited in note 19).
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while the crown itself might grant various privileges, it did so, not as a matter of
right, but as a matter of grace and for the purposes of better governing overseas
colonies. As plantations and trading posts developed into colonial societies, this
view of central officials as to the fundamental constitutional status of the
colonies remained essentially unchanged. By the early eighteenth century, it had
become the reigning view in England that granting privileges of self government
to distant colonies was the way to "us[e] them well"; 21 for the only alternative
was governing by force, which was expensive and likely to be counterproductive.
But such privileges were, nonetheless, contingent and provisional delegations of
power from above and were granted ultimately for the good of the realm.
The settlers themselves did not reject the top-down view of political authority, but neither did they accept it as the whole of the story. The settlers certainly.
treated their charters as a basis of authority, and they did not deny in principle
their status within the system as a whole. But there were several factors that, for
the colonists, pressed against this model of political authority. First, the settlers
had emigrated from an England that was localist in political organization: early
seventeenth-century English towns, boroughs, counties and guilds still operated
to a great extent as self-governing (although partially overlapping) entities.'
Second, the early settlers themselves had witnessed and participated in the
creation of their own political societies. (In most cases, these societies were
created formally under the auspices of charters, but not always. Most notably, in
New England, following the Pilgrim landing, a number of fishing and trading
villages were established in the area from Southern Maine to Massachusetts Bay
without any effective form of government granted from above and in some cases
without receiving permission from the New England Council to settle at all.) And
in the New England settlements, there was a third important factor: the powerful
influence of the covenanting theory of English separatism-the vision of an
"independent gathering of a few believers into a self-governing body relying on
the scriptures as their guide."' These factors contributed to a different understanding of the source of political authority, in which authority flowed not from
the top down, but from the bottom up.
Within colonial political thought, then, there existed from the very beginning
two different kinds of stories concerning the roots of political authority. In one
story, the settlements were created by law from above and owed their political
authority to the crown. In the other, the colonies were inherently self-governing
communities whose institutions grew from below and rested on a foundation of
consent. To be sure, the second kind of story differed in many respects between

21. John Trenchard's and Thomas Gordon's Cato's Letters, quoted in Greene, Peripheries and Center at 44 (cited in note 17).
22. Greene, Peripheries and Center at 11 (cited in note 17).
23. McLaughlin, Foundations at 32 (cited in note 19). As McLaughlin argues, this
separatist idea itself owed much to the tradition of English boroughs and merchant guilds,
and as well to the tradition of unincorporated joint-stock agreements and the old "sea
law" by which seafarers established a government for the duration of the passage. Id at
18-34.
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regions, and the New England version represented a more radical form of the
"bottom-up" story. But some version of the bottom-up account of political
authority ran through each of the settlements. And the colonists neatly combined
these two kinds of stories in what became the prevalent origin myth throughout
the colonies: that of a group of settlers who, at great risk, left England to found
new societies in the wilderness to bring prosperity to themselves and to England
and who, in consideration of those risks and the promise of great rewards which
England would receive from their trade, had been granted leave to establish
themselves as political communities in America. Thus, whereas the center
maintained, in principle, a relatively simple view of the constitutional basis of
colonial authority, for the colonists themselves that issue was, from the beginning, notably more complex.
The question as to the source of colonial political authority overlapped with
the issue of the scope of that authority and of the relationship between central
power and local power. From the perspective of the center, the answers to these
two questions were, indeed, the same; ultimate political authority originally
rested with the center and ultimate political authority continued to rest with the
center. For the colonists, however, these two questions did not fully map onto
each other. For even if authority was originally granted from above, it did not
follow that it could be revoked from above.24 And as the colonists came to
claim that certain matters were, of right, within the province of local institutions,
they could, and did, justify the authority of those intitutions as derived both
from above and from below.
If the early settlers had tended to think of themselves as self-governing
municipalities on the model of the English borough, increasingly they would
come to think of themselves as virtually distinct political societies and their assemblies as miniature Houses of Commons. The terms "House of Commons"
and "Parliament" were, indeed, used quite early on in Virginia, Maryland, the
Carolinas and the Bahamas, and in form and procedure, the assemblies tended
to model themselves on the English House of Commons." More importantly,
the assemblies, largely through their control of finance, began to exercise a
power of governance over their internal affairs that was comparable in many
respects to the power of Commons; and by the 1660s, many of the colonial
assemblies had come to regard themselves as the very "epitome of the House of

24. This was an extraordinarily complicated issue. In most cases, the grant of colonial
privileges and liberties was directly from the proprietors and only indirectly from the king.
Moreover, the colonists sometimes described this grant of power from above as part of a
"contract," a term which allowed an analogy both with borough or merchant charters
(which under certain circumstances could be legally revoked), but as well with the compact
that, it was commonly said, the king had made with the English nation to govern justly
(and that could not be legitimately revoked by the king).
25. Thus they demanded (with varying degrees of success) the right to render decisions
about qualifications, seating and discipline of their members and the right to establish
various rules for the conducting of legislative business. Andrews, Colonial Background at
7-9 (cited in note 19); Greene, Peripheries and Center at 31 (cited in note 17).
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Commons."" The rising power of the assemblies was well noted by crown
officials in the colonies, some of whom themselves occasionally slipped into
speaking of colonial assemblies on an analogy with Parliament 7 and who
objected that, in their incursions into the prerogative power, the assemblies went
(in the words of Governor Hunter of New York in 1711) "even beyond what
they were imagined to be in England."2" By the 1670s, officials in England were
"condemning the assemblies for trying to 'grasp all power'" and by the early
eighteenth century, governors in the colonies were frequently complaining that
"the assemblies had 'extorted so many powers from' their 'predecessors, that
there' was 'now hardly enough left to keep the peace, much less to maintain the
decent respect and regard that is due to the Queen's servant.'"29
However, as with the relationship between the top-down and bottom-up
models of political authority, the relationship, for the colonists, between the
authority of the center and the authority of colonial assemblies remained complex and the proper domain of each somewhat vague. Thus while, on the one
hand, the assemblies claimed increasing powers over local affairs, they never
denied in principle that their economies could be regulated to serve the needs of
the center, or that their laws were subject to the review of the Privy Council. But
nor, on the whole, did they feel the need to distinguish sharply between the
authority of the center and the authority of local institutions, for as a practical
matter, the center's regulation of the colonies was limited. Beginning in the
1650s, Parliament passed a series of navigation acts intended to insure that the
colonial economies served the interests of the realm, and in the 1670s, crown
officials began a concerted effort to bring the colonies further under the control
of the crown, which included plans for greater oversight of colonial legislation,
stricter instructions to governors, revocation of charters and a short-lived attempt
to govern New England as a single dominion.3" But the success of these attempts was restricted by the inherent difficulties of trying to manage colonies on
the other side of the ocean, by the distraction of other matters, by the relative
ignorance on the part of secretaries of state and the Privy Council of conditions
3
in America, and by a lack of domestic political support in Britain. '
While the attempts of central authorities to exert a stronger control over the
colonies were limited, one result of these efforts, especially in the half-century
from 1670 to 1720, was, however, to prompt colonial assemblies to defend their
privileges more explicitly in legal and constitutional terms.3 2 In doing so, the
colonists continued to appeal both to claims of delegation of authority from
above and to claims of authority from below; they argued, on the one hand, that
the royal grants of power to the colonists had become a matter of "ancient"

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Greene, Peripheries and Center at 31 (cited in note 17).
Andrews, Colonial Background at 37 (cited in note 19).
Id at 39-40.
Greene, Peripheries and Center at 32-33 (cited in note 17).
Id at 13-17.
Id at 17, 44.
Id at 15.
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usage and custom and, on the other, that political authority was "inherent in
themselves as representative bodies of the people. '3 3 The attempt to articulate
the precise scope of local power as against the center was, however, owing to the
very nature of the colonial relationship, difficult; and the assertions as to the
domain of local power remained indefinite. Thus while claiming "full legislative
powers"34 "'to choose the Laws by which we will be governed' and 'to be
governed only by such Laws,"' 3 s so long as they were not contrary to the Laws
of England, colonial advocates left open a number of questions concerning the
meaning of this significant last proviso. The assemblies did, however, deny the
right of the crown to bind them through instructions to the governor and, by the
mid-eighteenth century, would come to claim a virtually complete power to
regulate their own "internal" affairs.
If the center thus maintained a relatively simple view of the constitutional
order as essentially "top-down" and "center-out," the colonists held a more
complex and pluralist view, in which authority originated from multiple points
and in which the relationship between the authority of central and local institutions was divided and overlapping. But despite these fundamentally conflicting
views, outright confrontation between central authorities and the colonies over
constitutional issues remained relatively contained for most of colonial history.
In large part, this was due to the fact that, in practice, neither of the two
accounts required the denial of the other, and to the fact that neither side had an
interest in pressing its version too far. The colonists themselves certainly admitted the authority of their charters, they regarded themselves always as subjects of
the crown, and until very late, they never denied in principle their position
within the system or the general notion that their economies could be regulated
for the benefit of the mother country. Indeed, mercantilist policy brought the
colonists a good number of advantages, particularly the protection against
competition for their commodities; and when the burden of restrictions on trade
seemed to weigh too heavily, there were usually ways of getting around them.
For its part, the crown, although never accepting the colonial constitutional view,
had neither the incentive nor the capacity (without fundamentally restructuring
the system of colonial administration) to restrict colonial power over matters that
were internal or to enforce customs regulations strictly. The distances involved
made it difficult for the crown to regulate colonial activities too closely, and the
crown was convinced that maintaining the benefits of trade depended on keeping
the colonists happy. In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, there
was increased tension between the center's and the colonists' accounts of the
constitutional order, but beginning with the government of Robert Walpole in
1720, each side again moved to restrain its claims of fundamental principle. As
Jack Greene has written, Walpole applied to "colonial affairs ... many of the
underlying principles and techniques he had employed with such brilliant success

33. Andrews, Colonial Background at 40 (cited in note 19).
34. Greene, Peripheries and Center at 40 (cited in note 17).
35. Id at 37 (quoting New York Justice William Smith).
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in managing domestic affairs": avoiding "issues involving fundamentals and all
debates over basic principles .. restrict[ing] the active role of government as
much as possible and act[ing] only when it was expedient or necessary to do
so... attempt[ing] to bind potentially disruptive groups to the administration by
catering to their interests ... seek[ing] to adjust all disputes by compromise and
manipulation, and, if a choice had to be made between competing interests,
always ... align[ing] the government with the strongest."36 And the response
of colonial assemblies "seems to have been to secure local rights against the
power of the center in much the same way that those rights had been achieved
within the metropolis itself: through practice and usage that with the implicit
acquiescence of the center would gradually acquire the sanction of custom." 37
From the point of view of the center in the first half of the eighteenth century,
the accommodating strategy was an entirely successful one. By the middle part
of the century, "it had become a widely accepted 'Maxim' among British colonial
experts 'that Liberty and Encouragement' were 'the Basis of [successful]
colonies'" and that the robust development of the British colonies as compared
to the colonies of other powers was a direct consequence of Britain's having
"indulged" her colonies.3" And from the perspective of colonial representatives,
who had been more worried about the crown than about Parliament, the reliance
on pragmatic, rather than constitutional, arguments had succeeded in promoting
colonial interests within the ministry and in forging alliances with factions within
Parliament-factions which, fighting the prerogative at home, were ready to
oppose it overseas and which were, naturally enough, far warmer to arguments
about the dangers of royal prerogative than to arguments of colonial rights.
For a century and a half after the establishment of the first settlements, then,
the constitutional theory of the center and that of the colonies existed together
in a state of restrained tension. So long as the exercise of local power was seen
to benefit the realm, the central authorities had little incentive to push the
constitutional issues too far. And so long as they were allowed the liberty to
govern their internal affairs, colonial assemblies had little to gain by pressing the
issue of principle too far. At various times (especially between 1670 and 1720)
the tensions between the two constitutional accounts became particularly
pronounced. But, on the whole, central authorities permitted the growth of local
colonial institutions, while maintaining the principle that ultimate authority
rested with the center: that the colonies existed for the sake of the center and
that colonial self-government existed by grace, not by right. On the other side,
colonists could, for most of their history, regard themselves as comprising
distinct and self-governing societies while, at the same time, acknowledging the
principle that the colonies existed to serve the interests of the realm. And so long
as the center was willing to maintain its policy of "indulgence," colonial advo-

36. Id at 45-46.
37. Id at 47-48.
38. Archibald Kennedy, Observations on the Importance of the Northern Colonies
under Proper Regulations (New York, 1750), quoted in Id at 45.
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cates and assemblies did not need to define the precise relationship between local
authority and the authority of the center.
In the mid-eighteenth century, the issue of the constitutional relationship
between center and colonies would, however, be pressed and the conflict between
the two constitutional accounts would become especially manifest. Shortly, we
shall turn to consider this contest over the nature of colonial authority as it arose
in the years preceding the American revolution. But the conflict of those years
would be intimately bound up with another constitutional conflict which we
shall need to consider first-the conflict within England between Parliament and
the king.39
The English constitutional conflict would be significant for the colonial
constitutional conflict for several reasons. The first is analogical. The parliamentary opposition to the Stuarts' use of the prerogative power drew upon, and gave
further definition to, fundamental English constitutionalist ideas of political freedom, specifically about the relationship between government and the rights and
liberties of subjects. These ideas became part of the intellectual heritage of
English colonists, and in important respects, the arguments of seventeenthcentury parliamentarians were reproduced in the constitutional claims of colonists in the eighteenth century. The second significance of the seventeenth-century
English constitutional conflicts for our discussion is institutional. The ultimate
outcome of the struggle between Parliament and king was, of course, the
establishment, by about the middle of the eighteenth century, of Parliamentary
sovereignty within Britain, and, on Parliament's view, within the empire as
whole. Each of these legacies of the English constitutional battles will be important to our discussion in its own right. But especially important will be how each
side in the colonial conflict perceived the relationship between them. From the
perspective of the center, Parliamentary sovereignty realized the constitutional
ideals that were given voice in the seventeenth century conflicts. From the
perspective of the colonists, however, for whom political authority had always
been complex and divided, and whose self-government depended on the center's
not pressing its claim of complete political authority, the assertion of Parliamentary sovereignty threatened those constitutional ideals. In Sections IIC, I shall
describe the nature of the threat of Parliamentary sovereignty as it was perceived
by the colonists in the decade preceding the American Revolution. And in that
section and in Section III, I shall suggest how the nature of that threat importantly influenced revolutionary American constitutional thought. Because, however,
both Parliament's claim of sovereignty over the empire and the colonists' claim
of at least partial immunity from Parliamentary sovereignty drew on the legacy
of the conflicts of the seventeenth century, we shall need to take a step backwards and to examine the constitutional terms of that conflict.

39. Unless otherwise indicated, the term "king" will refer to the king-in-council. And,
similarly, mutatis mutandis, the terms "queen" and "monarch."
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B
To appreciate the nature of the constitutional issues at stake in the controversies between Parliament and the king in the seventeenth century, it is necessary to place those controversies within the context of an evolving constitutional
order. And it is necessary to consider that order at two levels: the level of
constitutional ideology and the level of constitutional practice. 0 For virtually
any political system, there is a difference between the reigning ideology and
existing practice, and because of this difference, it is often impossible to say precisely what the "constitution" is. The difference was especially important,
however in the constitutional context that we shall be examining, for while in
the sixteenth century, the role of Parliament had been changing significantly, this
change had occurred largely within the cocoon of traditional constitutional
theory and rhetoric. In discussing the seventeenth-century English constitution
and the constitutional contests of the period, we shall need, then, to be attentive
to matters of constitutional ideology and rhetoric; but we shall also need to be
attentive to developments in constitutional practice that were not well articulated
or theorized in constitutional terms.
The place to begin is with royal power. In theory, all power rested with the
king and that power was absolute. Even a member of Commons as ardent a
spokesman for the liberty of subjects as was Sir John Eliot would concede that
the king "hath supreme power, and is umpire and lord of his own actions, to
alter them upon good occasion of the state" and that, even with respect to
natural laws, "a prince may declare them, and with due weighing of the circumstances apply them to the diversity of facts with equity, for varietas
circumstaniarumvariat

.. us.

41

But if even ardent defenders of the liberty of subjects would concede that the
power of the king was absolute, even James I would concede that such a power
was not arbitrary and that a true king ruled under God and law. Just as God,
who once "spake by oracles and wrought by miracles," "settle[d] a Church,"
and thereafter governed "his people within the limits of his revealed will," so,
James held, was it with kings. While for early kings their mere "will served for

40. The term "constitutional" in its modem sense was just beginning to come into use
during this period. The term in its modem sense, however, offers a particularly useful construct for describing the conflicts of the period, as it refers both to existing political
practices and to legitimate authority. On the changing conception of the term "constitution", see Charles McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Cornell, 1947);
Charles McIlwain, Constitutionalism and the Changing World (Cambridge, 1939); Gerald
Stourzh, Constitution: Changing Meanings of the Term from the Early Seventeenth to the
Late Eighteenth Century in Terence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock, eds, Conceptual Change and
the Constitution 35-54 (Kansas, 1988); Gerald Stourzh, Fundamental Laws and Individual
Rights in the 18th Century Constitution, in J. Jackson Barlow, Leonard Levy and Ken
Masugi, eds, The American Founding 159-193 (Greenwood, 1988).
41. R.W.K. Hinton, Was Charles I a Tyrant? 18 Rev Pol 83 (1956).
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law," as
soon as kingdoms began to be settled in civility and polity, then did kings
set down their minds by laws, which are properly made by the king only,
but at the rogation of the people, and the king's grant being obtained
thereunto. And so the king became to be Lex loquens, after a sort, binding
himself by a double oath to the observation of the fundamental laws of this
kingdom: tacitly, as by being a King, and so bound to protect as well the
people as the laws of his kingdom, and expressly, by his oath at his coronation ....
And therefore a king governing in a settled kingdom leaves to
be a king and degenerates into a tyrant as soon as he leaves off to rule
according to his laws.42
The analogies ran easily between kings and shepherds, kings and husbands, and
kings and queen bees; each ruled in accordance with the laws of the kingdom
and of nature, and for the good of the whole. 3 A king who ceased to rule in
accordance with these laws and for the salus populi was not a king, but a tyrant,
such as-in a standard contrast-the Turkish Sultan, whose subjects and people
"do call themselves his slaves," for in such an empire no man "can assure
himself of his life, much less of his present fortune or [e]state, longer than it
pleaseth the Sultan."44
The obligation of the king towards God was a matter left to the two of
them. The obligation of the king to act in accordance with the law was, however, a more complex issue and involved both the abstract theoretical question of
the relationship between king and "the law" and an institutional question of
how that power was to be exercised. The abstract relationship between the king
and the law could be described in three different ways: in one sense, the king
could be said to be below the law; in another, the king could be said to be the
prolocutor of law (lex loquens); and in a third, the king could be said to be
above the law. In part, the difference between these concerned the meaning of
the term "law" and in part, it concerned the difference in the nature of the royal
action. The king was always required to act under the law of nature-to act in
accordance with right and in the interests of his kingdom. It was at least this
sense of law that was implied in Bracton's phrase, famously recited by Coke, that
the king is under no man, but is under God and the law." But "law" was used
as well in a more earthly sense to mean something like the common law, or
common law and equity, or the expressed law in general, and this law was the
law declared by the king as the fountain of justice. It was widely accepted-including by the early Stuart kings themselves (as reflected in the passage I

42. James I, Speech to Parliament (Mar 21, 1610), in J.R. Tanner, ed, Constitutional
Documents of James I 1603-1625 14, 16 (Cambridge, 1960).
43. Hinton, Was Charles I a Tyrant? at 77-82 (cited in note 41).
44. Id at 74.
45. Henry Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae 39 (Sir Travers Twiss, ed)
(G.P Putnam's Sons, 1878-83). The phrase was invoked by Coke in Prohibitions Del Roy
77 Eng Rep 1342-3 (K.B. 1607).
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just quoted)-that with respect to "ordinary" cases, the king had bound himself
to act according to this "law" as well. And as to the institutional question of
how this law was to be decided, while James I and Charles I were willing to
remove judges who opposed them and to attempt to influence the judges'
decisions, and while neither ever formally conceded the constitutional principle,
in practice they accepted that decisions of common law were to be made by the
king's judges and not by the king himself. It was, indeed, in the service of this
principle-in order to "assure James I that he was not in fact, what he was
according to admitted theory, the highest judge in his realm" 46-- that Coke
invoked Bracton's phrase.
However, if "ordinary" exercises of royal power were bound by the established law of the realm, the king possessed as well a "reserve" power that was
above, or beside, the ordinary law of the kingdom and that was bound only by
God, the law of nature and the good of the kingdom. This power was variously
referred to as the power of "government" or "policy," the power over "matters
of state" or the ius majestatis. Such an "absolute" power was "to be employed
and the normal course of the common law superseded, not arbitrarily and
'without cause,' but only 'for reasonable cause' or 'great and necessary cause'"
and 'because of the public utility of the church or the people.'47 One of the
more famous articulations of the distinction between the "ordinary" and "absolute" powers of the king was that offered by Chief Baron Fleming of the Court
of Exchequer in Bate's case, which arose from John Bate's refusal to pay a
custom duty to the crown on the grounds that the duty was illegal:
The King's power is double, ordinary and absolute, and they have several
laws and ends. That of the ordinary is for the profit of particular subjects,
for the execution of civil justice, the determining of meum; and this is
exercised by equity and justice in ordinary Courts, and by the Civilians is
nominated jus privatum and with us Common Law: and these laws cannot
be changed without Parliament, and although their form and course may
be changed and interrupted, yet they can never be changed in substance.
The absolute power of the king is not that which is converted or executed
to private use, to the benefit of any particular person, but is only that
which is applied to the general benefit of the people and is salus populi; as
the people is the body and the king is the head; and this power is [not]
guided by the rules which direct only at the Common Law, and is most
properly named policy and government; and as the constitution of this
body varieth with time, so varieth this absolute law according the wisdom
of the King for the common good; and these being general rules and true
as they are, all things done witlin these rules are lawful. The matter in
matter of State, and ought to be ruled by the rules of
question
4 is material
policy.

46. F.W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England 269 (Cambridge, 1931).

47. Francis Oakley, Jacobean Political Theology: The Absolute and Ordinary Powers
of King 29 J Hist Ideas 323, 344.
48. Bates' case, in Tanner, ed, Constitutional Documents of James I 338, 340-341
(cited in note 42). Other well-known articulations of this distinction appear in the
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The idea that there was an "area of policy formation where the king (although normally bound by the ordinary law)" might "initiate extra-legal actions
affecting his subjects' rights and liberties, sometimes in association with, sometimes independently of, the spokesmen for the universitas [regni]" had, according
to Brian Tierney, developed as early as the thirteenth century, "linked to the
growth of ideas of the state and the public welfare." 49 In matters of public
utility, kings and popes had "demanded of their subjects 'a sacrifice of private
rights and of the law that protected them."'5 0 And as Francis Oakley has
shown, the distinction between ordinary and absolute powers of the king appears
as early as the fourteenth century in the work of other students of Roman law,
and a similar distinction concerning the power of the Pope is present in the
canonist literature as early as the thirteenth century.5 The distinction between
the two kinds of power in the case of the Pope was made by analogy to God
himself who normally does not interfere with the laws of the world, but who,
"for some special reason" "can act 'aside from' (praeter)the common laws of
nature and perform a miracle." 52 And Professor Oakley has suggested that the
theological distinction between God's absolute and ordinary powers served, in
the early seventeenth century, as a model on the basis of which the power of the
king was conceived; so that while the king had consented to act through the
common law in the exercise of his "ordinary prerogative," his "reserve" power
was absolute and not limited by the law. 3 The analogy with God's absolute
and ordinary powers suggests that the relationship between the king's absolute
and ordinary powers was conceived of as something like a distinction between
justice and a particular instantiation of justice within the ordinary law. In such
a conception, while the king could be said to be required to act through the
ordinary law in those circumstances in which the ordinary law represented justice
or the common good overall, in those cases in which the ordinary law was in
arguments of the attorneys general in Darnel's case, see T.B. Howell, ed, 3 A Complete
Collection of State Trials 1, 36-37 (Hansard, 1816) and the Ship-Money case, Howell, ed,
3 State Trials 826, 1016.

49. Brian Tierney, Bracton on Government 38 Speculum 309 (1963). Tierney notes
that this idea "spread from Roman law first to canon law (where a complex doctrine on
status ecclesiae had grown up by 1200), then slowly into the law and constitutional theory
of various secular kingdoms. Status regni was a common expression by the mid-thirteenth
century, and from certain medieval usages of the term there developed eventually the
Renaissance "reason of state." Id at 310.
50. Oakley, Jacobean Political Theology at 344 (cited in note 47), citing Gaines Post,

Studies in Medieval Legal Thought: Public Law and the State 1100-1327 12 (Princeton,
1964).
51. Oakley, Jacobean Political Theology at 332 (cited in note 47).
52. Id at 333.
53. Id at 337. As opposed to the absolute power of God which was truly unbounded
(save for the principle of non-contradiction), the "absolute" power of the king was,
Professor Oakley points out, nonetheless thought, both by civilians and common lawyers,
to be limited, although the nature of those limits were not very clearly articulated. Id at
339-40.
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some way deficient or partial, the king's absolute powers allowed him to act in
the interest of what was, all told, actually just or for the good of the whole.
Indeed, as Holdsworth has argued, the distinction between the ordinary and
absolute powers of the king was developed by crown lawyers during the Tudor
period on the model of the old and familiar conception of the distinction
between law and equity.5"
As to these theoretical powers of the king, there was little serious dispute.
However, to say that matters of state were to be decided by the king and were
not bound by the ordinary law still left open the crucial institutional issue on
which the great conflict would turn; for as James Whitelock argued in Commons, the "sovereign power is agreed to be in the king: but in the king is a
twofold power-the one in parliament, as he is assisted with the consent of the
whole state; the other out of parliament, as he is sole and singular, guided merely
by his own will.""5 The question, in the words of Oliver St. John (arguing in
the Ship-Money case), was thus not simply
de persona, in whom the suprema potestas... doth lie, for that is in the

king; but the question is only de modo, by what medium or method this
supreme power, which is in his Majesty, doth infuse and let out itself into
this particular...
His majesty is the fountain of justice; and though all justice which is
done within the realm flows from this fountain, yet it must run in certain
and known channels...
And as without the assistance of his judges, who are his settled counsel
at law, his Majesty applies not the law and justice in many cases unto his
subjects; so likewise in other cases neither is this sufficient to do it without
the assistance of his great Council in parliament."
In the view of James and Charles, however, where matters of "government"
were concerned, the suprema potestas lay with the king alone, for such matters
were "far above" the "reach and capacity" of subjects or their representatives in
Parliament.5 7 Parliament, was "nothing else but the head court of the King and

54. Sir William Holdsworth, 4 The History of English Law (Little, Brown, 1924) 206.
See also T.F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 194 (Cambridge, 4th
ed 1948).
55. Whitelock's Speech on Impositions, in Tanner, ed, Constitutional Documents of
James 1 247, 260 (cited in note 42).
56. St. John, arguing in the Ship-Money case, Rex v Hampden, in J.P. Kenyon, ed,
The Stuart Constitution, 1603-1866: Documents and Commentary 98, 98 (Cambridge, 2d
ed 1986).
57. Letter of James I to the Commons (1621) in Carl Stephenson and Frederick
George Marcham, eds, Sources of English ConstitutionalHistory 427, 427 (Cornell, 1937).
Holdsworth suggested that the prerogative claims of the Smarts were advanced, in
part, by merging two different ideas that had been held in the sixteenth century; the first,
that there were certain powers that were inseparable from the person of the king either
because they could not be delegated (such as the power to pardon crimes) or because, in
the particular case of the dispensing power, of the logical difficulty that the dispensing
power could presumably dispense with any attempt to restraint it; and the second that the
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his vassals,""8 and, when reasons of state were involved, nothing more than an

advisory council. In Parliament, the "laws are but craved by his subjects," but
"only made" by the king "at their rogation and with their advice." 9 And although monarchy is, James affirmed, "the stronger and the surer built" "by the
advice and assistance of Parliament,"" yet, as Charles would put it, if there
were not a "correspondency between" the king and the Houses of Parliament,
the king "should be enforced to use new counsels." 6 One of the clear manifestations of this view was the willingness of James to bypass Parliament in creating
new legal offenses-enforced by the Star Chamber-and, indeed, to do so even
after the practice was opined to be unlawful by the king's judges.62 And Charles
showed himself to be entirely willing to "use new counsels" for the eleven years
between 1629 and 1640 when no Parliament was called.
The conflict over the place of the king-in-Parliament within constitutional
order-the question, that is, "by what medium or method" the "supreme
power ... doth infuse and let out itself" in a particular case-owed a great deal
to the institutional changes in Parliament that had occurred during the Tudor
period. Two such developments are particularly noteworthy here. First, while
Parliament continued to be spoken of as a court, it had come to be much more
than that; during the Tudor years, the conception of Parliament as simply
declaring law could hardly any more "easily be applied to those powers of
taxation and legislation which were fast coming to be [its] most important

king had an absolute power that was not subject to the ordinary law. Combining the two
allowed the "prerogative lawyers of the seventeenth century to deduce" "the theory that
the king had, inseparably attached to his person, a general absolute prerogative to act as
he pleased, which he could use whenever he saw fit." Holdsworth, 4 The History of
English Law at 204-07 (cited in note 54).
58. The True Law of Free Monarchies, in Tanner, ed, Constitutional Documents of
James I 9, 9 (cited in note 42).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Speech by Sir Dudley Carleton, House of Commons (May 12, 1626) in Kenyon,
ed, Stuart Constitution 45, 45 (cited in note 56) (referring to the king's message).
62. Under Henry VIII, Parliament had given the king the power to issue proclamations
with the force of law. The act was repealed in the first year of Edward VI, but Elizabeth
in particular continued to issue proclamations, which were not illegal, but had only
whatever force they had under the common law. The use of proclamations, however,
increased under James, and in 1610, the House protested on the grounds that "it is the
indubitable right of the people of this kingdom not to be made subject to any punishment
that shall extend to their lives, lands, bodies or goods, other than such as are ordained
by the common laws of this land, or the statutes made by their common consent in
parliament."
In his answer to the petition, James consulted Coke, who was then Chief Justice of
the Common Pleas, on the legality of proclamations and attempted to elicit from him
approval. After consulting with three other judges, Coke responded that while a proclamation might aggravate an offense that was already illegal, it could not create a new offense
or make an offense punishable by the Star Chamber that was not already so. See
Maitland, Constitutional History at 256-58 (cited in note 46) and J.R. Tanner, English
Constitutional Conflicts of the Seventeenth Century: 1603-1689 37-38 (Cambridge, 1962).
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functions."" The second important development was of the bill procedure.
While decrees of the king-in-Parliament had once been merely the responses of
the king's council to petitions-"the Government's vague reply to vaguely
worded complaints,"" often drafted after a Parliament had been dissolved-by
the end of the sixteenth century, the bill procedure had taken on an essentially
modem form in which legislation was watched by "the lawyers in Commons and
the judges in the Lords" and became a "deliberate adoption of specific proposals
embodied in specific texts."" The initiative for legislation generally still rested
with the monarch, and as a matter of constitutional rhetoric, the monarch was
still said to be the ruling element in Parliament; but as a matter of fact, the
Houses had clearly become participants in the governing process. Together, these
two features of Parliament-the evolution of Parliament into a legislative body
and the development of the modern statutory form-represented, at least as a
matter of practice, a significant change in the role of the Houses. "So long as
legislation took the form of a petition to the king," as Holdsworth says, "those
petitions which resulted in legislation did not differ materially from petitions
which resulted in a judicial decree.... But there could be no talk of petition in
connection with the many important bills which during this period originated
with the crown; and as they required the consent of both Houses, their passage
emphasized the fact that Parliament was a partner in the work of legislation."""
The developments in the nature and role of Parliament during the period of
the Tudors had both contributed to, and had grown out of, a broader evolution
in the conception of kingship. With the development of the "territorial state"
and the "definite subordination of the church to" it in the sixteenth century, the
king had come increasingly to be understood as the head of a state; and with this
evolution, the old medieval metaphor of the king as head of the body politic
assembled in Parliament was resuscitated and put to new use.' In 1522, Chief,
Justice Fineux could thus refer to Parliament as a corporation of the king, lord
and commons," a conception that had become familiar by the last years of the
century when Coke described Parliament as the "great corporation or body

63. Holdsworth, 4 English Law at 184 (cited in note 54). In part, as Holdsworth
notes, Parliament could continue to be spoken of as a court because all courts had, under
the Tudors, come to take on some non-judicial functions. Id at 183.
64. T.F.T. Plucknett, Ellesmere on Statutes 60 L Q Rev 248 (1944).
65. Id.
66. Holdsworth, 4 English Law at 185 (cited in note 54).
67. Id at 200. On the medieval idea of the king as the head of a body politic, see
F.W. Maitland, The Crown as Corporation;F.W. Maitland, The Corporation Sole; and
F.W. Maitland, Moral Personality and Legal Personality reprinted in H.D. Hazeltine, G.
Lapsley and P.H. Winfield, eds, Selected Essays (Cambridge, 1936). Maitland stressed often
the ambiguous relationship in English law between the two bodies of the king. On this,
see the above-cited articles and also Maitland's introductory essay in Otto Gierke, Political
Theories of the Middle Age xxvi-xl (Cambridge, 1951) (Maitland, trans).
68. Maitland, The Crown as Corporation, in Hazeltine, Selected Essays at 107 (cited
in note 67). For additional references to the idea of Parliament as a corporation, see
Holdsworth, 4 English Law at 184, n 3 (cited in note 54).
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politic of the kingdom."69 In Holdsworth's words, the English king at the time
of the Tudors "was the representative of the state, his prerogative was the source
of the executive authority in the state, and he and this [sic] Council had large
judicial powers; but he was not the sole source of all authority. The state was
conceived, not as centering in him alone, but as consisting of a body politic
composed of himself as head, and the three estates of his realm as members." 7"
The Tudors had been willing to accede to the idea that a certain amount of
royal power was to be exercised by the king-in-Parliament partly because their
Parliaments had been so compliant,7' but also because the exercise of Parliamentary power did not much encroach into matters that involved pure reasons
of state. Indeed, the authority of the king-in-Parliament under the Tudors had
not so much grown at the expense of the power of the king outside of Parliament, as alongside an increase in the prerogative. Moreover, the expanding
authority of Parliament and the expanding use of the prerogative had been
accompanied by a general increase in the prosperity of the subjects who sat in
Parliament. 2 For most of the Tudor period, then, the monarchs had not thus
experienced Parliament as a constraint on their governing power, nor had the
great subjects in Parliament experienced the prerogative power as a great threat
to their property or liberty. And while the Houses had well accepted that many
matters of government were the exclusive concern of the king-in-council, the
Tudors had been quite willing to respect the authority of Parliament in certain
kinds of matters and to treat the Houses as partners in those areas.7"
But what precisely, were those matters and those areas? What kind of
institution was Parliament becoming? In a famous and influential book, Charles
McIlwain described the medieval and early modern English constitutional order
in terms of two spheres of royal power: one, the power of government (guber-

69. Holdsworth, 4 English Law at 184 (cited in note 54).
70. Id.

71. As Maitland has noted, it was an ironic feature of the Tudor period that the
monarchs, particularly Henry, were willing to raise the status of Parliament precisely
because the latter was so pliable and because "it strengthens" the hands of the king "that
what he does should be the act of the whole nation." Maitland, Constitutional History at
252 (cited in note 46).
The reasons for Parliament's tractability were many and included the skill of the
Tudor kings and their advisors in managing Parliament, the fear of domestic insurrection
and foreign invasion (which made parliaments especially amenable to strong uses of the
prerogative power), and the existence of generally prosperous economic conditions,
particularly for those classes present in Parliament.
72. Margaret Atwood Judson, The Crisis of the Constitution: An Essay in Constitutional and Political Thought in England, 1603-1645 81-83 (Octagon, 1964).
73. When Henry VIII said "[w]e at no time stand so high in our estate royal as in the
time of parliament; when we as head, and you as members are conjoined and knit
together into on body politic", see Ferrer's Case in J.R. Tanner, ed, Tudor Constitutional
Documents: 1486 - 1603 580, 582 (Cambridge, 1922), it was a tone very different from
that struck by Bacon's later characterization of the king in Parliament as "attend[ed]"
upon by the Houses and in the "exaltation of his orb." Quoted by Judson, The Crisis of
the Constitution at 70 (cited in note 72).
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naculum), which, Mcllwain argued, resided entirely in the hands of the king and
over which the king enjoyed unfettered discretion to promote the 'interests of the
state; and the other, the power to decide matters of law (jurisdictio) which
resided in the king's courts and in Parliament as the highest court in the
realm.'4 However, this way of describing the distinction, as it was developing
during the Tudor period, between the power of the king outside of Parliament
and the power of the king-in-Parliament is, for several reasons, too simple. First,
although there was still no firm delineation during the Tudor period between the
king's wealth and the common wealth," much of the supply that the king
requested from Parliament was used for matters of state, and Parliaments were
more generous with revenues when they felt the needs of the state to be greater.
Although Parliament did not presume to limit the way in which the revenues
would be spent,76 the decision as to how large of a supply to grant itself clearly
involved matters of government. A second and more important problem with the
McIlwain characterization of the legitimate domain of Parliament's power is that
it assumes that Parliament was still essentially a court.7 But although the
distinction between declaring existing law and enacting new law was still not
that sharply made at this time,7" it is clear that Parliament was increasingly
doing a good deal of the latter. And the legislation of Parliament clearly touched
upon matters of "government." There was, to be sure, a large area of governing
into which Parliament would not normally intrude; but the distinction between
that which might be a legitimate concern of Parliament and that which was out
of Parliament's hands could no longer be accurately described (if it ever could

74. See generally Mcllwain, Constitutionalism:Ancient and Modern (cited in note 40).
Mcllwain claimed that the distinction between the power of the king over matters of
government [gubernaculum] and the power of the king over matters of law [jurisdictio] is
apparent even in Bracton. Id at 67-92. That claim, however, has been disputed by Tierney,
Bracton on Government at 295-217 (cited in note 49); and Ewart Lewis, King Above
Law? 'Quod Principi Placuit' in Bracton, 39 Speculum 240 (1964).
Mcllwain's interpretation of the early Stuart constitutions has been criticized by
Corinne Comstock Weston and Janelle Renfrow Greenberg in Subjects and Sovereigns: The

Grand Controversy over Legal Sovereignty in Stuart England, 8-18 (Cambridge, 1981), and
Oakley, Jacobean Political Theology (cited in note 47). Even these critics, however, have
generally accepted the notion that in matters of government, the discretionary power of
the king was in his own person and have focussed their criticism on the claim that the
sphere of jurisdictio was a "coordinate," rather than subordinate, sphere. The acceptance
of the idea that matters of government were in the hands of the king alone may be due
to the tendency to focus on the constitutional rhetoric of the period, rather than on the
institutional practices, which were not always accompanied by well-developed theories.
75. Maitland, The Crown as Corporation at 108 (cited in note 67).
76. According to Tanner, the Subsidy Bill of 1624, which granted money for the particular purpose of fighting a war with Spain, was the first attempt of Parliament to
regulate the use of the revenues it granted; an "experiment" that "was not at once repeated." Tanner, English Constitutional Conflicts at 50 (cited in note 62).
77. For Mcllwain's view that Parliament was, indeed, still essentially a court, see
Charles Mcllwain, The High Court of Parliamentand its Supremacy: An HistoricalEssay
on the Boundaries between Legislation and Adjudication in England (Yale, 1910).
78. J.W. Gough, Fundamental Law and English Legal History 42-48 (Oxford, 1955).
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be) simply in terms of a distinction between adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory
functions.
To a large extent, the distinction between those matters that were dealt with
through the royal prerogative and those that were submitted to, or taken up by,
Parliament, was governed by tradition and by accommodation to the needs of
the moment. But if we want to try to characterize in a general way the distinction, as it was developing especially during the later Tudor years, between those
kinds of matters thought to be within the power of the monarch alone and those
issues that were most clearly thought to be within the province of Parliament, we
would do better to put it in terms of the degree to which the issue directly
affected the property and liberty interests of subjects, rather than in terms of
whether it involved, strictly speaking, an interpretation of existing law. There
was, of course, no such clearly stated rule to this effect and certainly a king
could, if he so desired, introduce any question into Parliament for its consideration. (During the Tudor period, bills had been brought before the Houses that
concerned constitutional matters which it was thought by the monarch necessary
or advisable to be decided on the authority of the whole nation assembled in
Parliament: transferring to the king authority as supreme head of the church of
England; altering the succession to the throne; voiding and validating marriages;
dealing with Mary Queen of Scots; and so forth.") But the heart of
Parliament's work, and the work that was most thought to be in the domain of
Parliament, involved matters that more directly affected the property and liberty
of subjects: legislation that would change common law rights and duties between
individuals, that would erase Henry's debts, that would attaint individuals or
restore blood, that would regulate wages and terms of apprenticeship, that would
regulate dress, that would regulate trade and the trades in various ways, that
would regulate the use of land and agricultural production, and so on; and, as
well, of course, revenue measures. These acts directly affected the subject's
property and liberty, and as such, it was generally thought they should receive
the consent of Parliament; for in Parliament "every Englishman is intended to be
there present, either in person or by procuration and attorneys" and therefore
"justlie no man can complaine, but must accommodate himselfe to finde it good
and obey it.""0
The criteria of whether an act imposed a significant and direct burden on the
property or liberty of subjects is hardly a very precise or absolute one and there
were certainly areas-for example, emergency powers-in which the king clearly
might impose even very substantial burdens without Parliamentary consent. As

79. G.R. Elton has characterized parliament's function partly, as well, as a "sounding
board to assist government" in deciding upon its policies. G.R. Elton, Parliament, in
Christopher Haigh, ed, The Reign of Elizabeth I 98 (MacMillan, 1984). See also G.R.
Elton, The Body of the Whole Realm: Parliament and Representation in Medieval and
Tudor England, in 2 Studies in Tudor and Stuart Politics and Government 59 (Cambridge,
1983). But certainly at the heart of Parliament's work was taxation and legislation.
80. Sir Thomas Smith, De Republica Anglorum 48-49 (Cambridge, 1906) (L. Alston,
ed).
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I have noted, the domain of prerogative powers was partly defined by tradition,
and while the traditional delineation of the prerogative was itself not unrelated
to the issue of the burden on the property and liberty of subjects, traditional
prerogative powers often continued to be thought of as such even as they came
to impose more direct and substantial burdens on these interests. Nonetheless,
the role of Parliament tended to be understood in terms of representing the
property and liberty of subjects; and with respect to issues that significantly
affected those interests, "the parties in Parliament (in those things that concerne
the publique) meddle not as meere Judges, but as Parties interessed, with things
that concern every one of their own Rights," for "it is neither Law nor Reason
that some of the Parties should determine of that that concernes all their mutuall
interests, invita alteraparte, against the will of anyone but the parties.""'
The distinction between matters that directly imposed on the property and
liberty of subjects and those that did not was relevant, for example, to the
question of the power of the Houses to introduce a matter for consideration by
Parliament. With respect to matters that they considered purely matters of state,
the Tudors remained jealous of their power to initiate discussion in Parliament,
for they understood the "embarrassment" to "the conduct of government" that
was threatened by unrestrained Parliamentary privilege.82 In his address to the
Houses in 1559, the lord keeper Sir Nicholas Bacon strongly implied that the
Houses should stay away from "matters of state," and at the end of the Parliament of 1571, he criticized those members "although not many in number, who
in the proceeding of this Session, have shewed themselves audacious, arrogant,
and presumptuous" by "calling her Majesties Grants and Prerogatives also in
question" and "spending much time meddling with matters neither pertaining to
them nor within the capacity of their understanding." 83 Elizabeth was particularly concerned with the attempts of various members of Commons to introduce
bills "into the House against the prerogative of the Queen," 84 and admonished
Commons "to meddle with no matters of state" 5 and to avoid matters that
"pass the reach of a subject's brayne." 6 Elizabeth was not always successful in
enforcing this view and the Houses often attempted to initiate discussion on matters that only indirectly involved property and liberty interests. But while on

81. Dudley Digges, A Review of the Observations upon some of his Majesties late
Answers and Expresses (1643), quoted by Judson, Crisis of the Constitution at 79 (cited
in note 72). These words were uttered during the reign of Charles I. But they express well
the role of Parliament as jt was well-developing in the Tudor period, and particularly the
late Tudor period. It is significant that it is a view of Parliament's role that had become
sufficiently conventional by the 1640s that it would be made, as it was, by a supporter
of Charles and even after the outbreak of civil war.
82. Holdsworth, 4 English Law at 178 (cited in note 54).
83. Quoted in McIlwain, Constitutionalism:Ancient and Modern at 109 (cited in note

40).
84. Tanner, ed, Tudor Constitutional Documents 557 (cited in note 73).
85. Queen's Answer, through the Lord Keeper, to the Speaker's claim of Privilege, 4
April 1571, in Tanner, ed, Tudor Constitutional Documents at 556 (cited in note 73).
86. Quoted in Holdsworth, 4 English Law at 90 (cited in note 54).
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occasion, the queen found it prudent to allow discussion to proceed, "she always
refused, whenever possible, to allow members to discuss topics which she
disliked," and in general the House of Commons was "inclined to acquiesce in
the crown's claim to the initiative ' s7 in high matters of state. When in 1587,
Peter Wentworth raised the issue of the privilege of the Houses in the context of
a bill proposing a new book of common prayer, he was immediately sent to the
tower, with little opposition from the House; and when, six years later, he and
others again raised the question of the royal succession, he was again imprisoned, this time, apparently, until his death three years later."8 And in 1593, the
lord keeper closed his address to Parliament by instructing the Speaker of "her
Majesties Pleasure" that if any "idle Heads" who "will not stick to hazard their
own Estates" "exhibite any Bill to such purpose, that you will receive them not,
until they be viewed and considered by those, who it is fitter should consider of
such things, and can better judge of them." 9
And yet, at the same time that Tudor monarchs jealously guarded the power
to initiate discussion in matters of state (which is to say, to prohibit their
discussion altogether if so desired), they recognized the liberty of the Houses to
initiate discussion and to introduce bills on a range of matters that directly
concerned the property and liberty of subjects. It had always been the case that
the most important function of the House of Commons was to resolve grievances
of the subject, and this function did not change as Parliament moved towards
being a legislative body.9" In the same address, in 1559, in which he suggested
that the Houses should stay away from discussing matters of state which had not
been put to them, the lord keeper Bacon described part of the mission of the
Houses as determining whether "any laws be too severe and too sharp, or too
soft and too gentle," for, as he put it in his speech four years later, laws which
were too severe "may put in peril both the nocent and the innocent." 9 ' Similarly, while in matters of religion, foreign policy and foreign trade, Elizabeth
insisted on the right of the crown to initiate discussion, in domestic "social and
economic matters the official role was often one of accepting, rather than

87. Id at 178-79.
88. Tanner, ed, Tudor Constitutional Documents at 556 (cited in note 73).
89. Quoted in Mcllwain, Constitutionalism:Ancient and Modern at 110 (cited in note
40).
The question of Parliament's privilege to initiate discussion really involved two different issues which, for reasons of brevity, are not distinguished in the text. The first was
whether a matter was proper for Parliament at all and the second was whether, even if
it was, discussion should be initiated by the Houses. Thus certain acts of "government"
that might impose significant burdens on subjects if passed might be sent to Parliament for
approval; but at the same time, the monarch might resist an attempt by the Houses to
introduce the matter for.
90. See G.R. Elton, Parliament in the Sixteenth Century: Function and Fortunes, in 3
Studies in Tudor and Stuart Politics and Government 181 (Cambridge, 1983).
91. Quoted by T.E. Hartley, Elizabeth's Parliaments: Queen, Lord and Commons,
1559-1601 19-20 (Manchester, 1992).
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initiating policy."92 Thus did Elizabeth "work[] out what in effect was a new
constitutional rule, according to which issues debated in Parliament fell into two'
categories-matters of the common weal, to be raised by anyone," and those
issues more purely matters93 of state "which could be discussed only if she invited
the Parliament to do so."
However, as economic developments in the sixteenth century began to
expand dramatically the range of liberty and property interests (at least for the
great subjects of the realm who sat in Parliament), and as prerogative powers
began to be used in ways that imposed heavier burdens on subjects (particularly
those subjects who mattered) and in ways thought by many members of Parliament not to be in the common good, the conflict between the prerogative power
and the private interests of subjects grew sharper. The power of "government"
included, of course, the power to impose on individual property and liberty in
the interests of the common good, and it was well agreed that in, for example,
cases of emergency, the monarch might exercise all sorts of powers that involved
imposing on the liberties and property of subjects without Parliamentary consent.
But as to the crown's power to impose these burdens during times of peace
without Parliamentary involvement, the issue was far more controversial and
became more contentious as the burden of the prerogative power came to be
more keenly felt.
The question, once again, was not whether the monarch had the power, but
whether that power should be exercised by the monarch alone. And the fear of
many in Parliament was that if the monarch did not act through Parliament,
where the liberty and property interests of subjects were represented, burdens
might well be imposed on liberty and property, and grievous burdens at that, for
reasons not sufficiently justified by the common good. The power to grant
monopolies, for example, was long regarded as firmly within the scope of the
prerogative-"the head Pearl in" the "Crown and Diadem"' 4-and in 1571,
9s But the power,
Elizabeth rebuked members of Parliament for questioning it.
which had been intended to be used to encourage enterprise and invention, had
become "primarily a means of "gratifying courtiers and officials"' 6 and the
burden from Elizabeth's expansive use of the monopoly power was deeply felt in
the depression that prevailed in the last years of the century." The issue of
monopolies was thus taken up by Parliament in 1597, and, in response, the
queen promised to end the abuses. When she failed to make good on these
promises, the issue was taken up again by the Parliament of 1601 and became
the central issue of the Parliamentary session, in which members of the House

92. Hartley, Elizabeth's Parliaments at 28 (cited in note 91).
93. Elton, Parliament at 97 (cited in note 79).
94. Thomas Egerton, quoted in Mcllwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modem at
120 (cited in note 40).
95. Holdsworth, 4 English Law at 347 (cited in note 54).
96. Penry Williams, The Crown and the Counties, in Christopher Haigh, ed, The Reign
of Elizabeth I 134 (MacMillan, 1984).
97. Holdsworth, 4 English Law at 347 (cited in note 54).
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complained that monopolies were putting "general profit into a private hand""'
while the country "groaneth and languisheth under" their burden,99 and subjects were reduced to a state of "beggary and bondage."' 0 Francis Bacon, reminding members of the House of the common good that monopolies were
intended to serve, and reiterating the high place of the monopoly power within
the prerogative, urged the House to proceed humbly by petition, rather than by
bill.' But the "grievance was so seriously felt" that many in Parliament insisted on proceeding by statute0 2 and in the end, the queen was forced to revoke
the most unpopular of the patents and allow the others to be tested through the
ordinary courts.
Here we see the complex position of Parliament with respect to matters of
government. The monopoly power was conceded by all to be a high part of the
prerogative and no one would have suggested, for example, that the granting of
patents should be in any hands but of the queen and her council. And yet when
the exercise of the monopoly power was felt to grieve the subject, the House
claimed the right to call into question whether certain exercises of the prerogative were genuinely in the common good, and if not, to take action against
them. Was Parliament here acting simply in the ordinary judicial role of a court,
"declaring" the law? To some extent it was; the language of law and of the
rights of subjects were certainly very much present in these debates and some of
the proposals would have done nothing more than restate the law and subject
the patents to review by ordinary courts.0 3 And yet even such an action as that
would have, in practice, changed the law, for the ordinary courts had been prevented by the queen's council from hearing challenges to most of these grants on
the grounds that the question of whether the grants were for the common good
was one left to the determination of the queen; and the ordinary courts themselves recognized the queen's power to restrict their jurisdiction in matters of
state. A statute that left all monopolies to be tested by these courts would thus,
even to the extent that it merely repeated the existing law, have amounted to a
definite change in the legal order."° But some of the proposals went well be-

98. Francis Moore, MP for Reading, quoted by Williams, Crown and Counties at 134
(cited in note 96).
99. MP Martin in the Debate on Monopolies, in Tanner, ed, Tudor Constitutional
Documents 573, 574 (cited in note 73).
100. MP Francis Moore, quoted by Williams, Crown and Counties at 134 (cited in note
96).
101. "[This is no stranger in this place but a stranger in this vestment; the use [that
is the normal procedure] hath been ever to humble ourselves unto her Majesty, and by
petition desire to have our grievances remedied, especially when the remedy toucheth her
so nigh in point of prerogative." Francis Bacon in the Debate on Monopolies, 1601 in
Tanner, ed, Tudor Constitutional Documents 573, 574 (cited in note 73).
102. Tanner, ed, Tudor Constitutional Documents at 557 (cited in note 73).
103. Hartley, Elizabeth's Parliaments at 149 (cited in note 91).
104. Part of the difficulty in saying whether Parliament was merely interpreting law
comes from the fact that the term "law" was used in more than one way. It was

sometimes used to refer to the common law or the "ordinary course of law," but it also
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yond this and would have modified the standards by which monopolies would
be judged. In general, the House did not seem to be preoccupied with the
question of whether it was, or to what extent it was, reforming the law rather
than enforcing it; what it was moving against were grievous burdens on the
subject that had no sufficient justification in the common good. "What shall
become of us, from whom the fruits upon our own soil and the commodities of
our own labor.., shall be taken away by warrant of supreme authority which
the poor subject dares not gainsay."' In responding to such grievances, Parliament was not merely acting as a court (in the ordinary sense), but as a kind of
mediating institution between the subjects, represented in the Houses, and
interests of government. Matters of government were, it could still be said, the
province of the queen. But the greater the felt imposition of such policies on the
liberties and property of subjects, the more forceful the move by the Houses to
bring the issue in the arena of the queen-in-Parliament where the burdens on
subjects might be better considered in the determination of the common good.
I have been dwelling on the Tudor years, and especially the later Tudor
years, to emphasize the kind of role that Parliament had been coming to play, a
role that was, in part, traditional-the role of presenting grievances and voting
money grants-but that was taking on a different form as Parliament developed
into a legislative body. And it was this function of Parliament as a mediating
body between the interests of government and the property and liberty of
subjects that was centrally contested in the constitutional conflicts of the early
(and late) Stuart reigns.
Many of the most famous constitutional controversies during the period of
the early Stuarts were connected to judicial cases in which the question was
raised of the power of courts to restrain the prerogative. And in most of these
cases, the courts held that the prerogative power over matters of state was not,
in fact, restrainable by the ordinary law. In Bate's case, for example, the Court
of Exchequer held that the imposition of customs duties, being part of the king's
absolute power to act for "the general benefit of the people" and not "guided by
the rules which direct only at the Common Law," were not justiciable in ordinary courts. 116 In Rex v Hampden, a majority of the judges of the high courts
sitting en banc similarly held that the king's demand for so-called ship-money' 07 was not reviewable because the king's "averment of the danger was not
might refer to the whole of the legal regime. The king's prerogative powers thus might be
referred to as "regal" rather than "legal," in the sense that they were not subject to the
constraints of the ordinary law but were rather-as it was sometimes said-"beside the
law"; just as we could say that equity is not "law." But in a broader sense, as Coke
himself said, "prerogative is part of the law." Quoted in McIlwain, Constitutionalism:
Ancient and Modern at 126 (cited in note 40). It thus did not appear as a contradiction
to say in the same breath that "we shall acknowledge a regal, as well as a legal power"
and then "Let us give that to the King, that the law gives him, and no more." Id
(quoting a member of Parliament).
105. Hartley, Elizabeth's Parliaments at 151 (cited in note 91).
106. Bate's case, in Tanner, ed, Constitutional Documents of James I at 343 (cited in
note 42).
107. The demand for ship money had been based on the king's power to commandeer
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traversable, it must be binding when he perceives and says there is a danger."'0 8 And in Darnel's Case (the Case of the Five Knights), the King's Bench
held that defendants, who had been imprisoned by the Privy Council per speciale
mandatum Domini Regis for refusing to pay Charles's forced loan of 1626 and
had sued out a writ of habeas corpus, were not entitled to be bailed by the common courts. Perhaps because such cases as these indicated the power of the
prerogative over the ordinary law, the constitutional issues of the Stuart years
have sometimes been discussed as essentially involving a clash between the prerogative power and the law.
However, the question of the power of ordinary courts to restrain the
prerogative was secondary, in a rather straightforward sense, to the larger
constitutional issue of the relationship between the prerogative power and the
power of Parliament. For, needless to say, none of these royal policies would
have been at all problematic if they had been enacted through Parliament. By
this, I do not mean primarily that Parliament might have lent additional credibility to the use of prerogative courts or royal proclamations-although this is
true as well and was true during the Tudor period-but rather the much more
obvious point that these policies, if pursued through Parliament, would not have
required the use of extra-ordinary legal measures at all; that is, what raised a
fear when called a proclamation and enforced by the Star Chamber would have
been a statute when passed by Parliament and would have been enforceable
through the ordinary courts. What raised the concern and what led to these
famous judicial cases were policies that imposed direct and often serious burdens
on subjects without any Parliamentary participation.
The view of James and Charles was that no such Parliamentary involvement
was necessary, for all these policies were acts of government. For parliamentarians, however, these policies imposed substantial burdens on the property and
liberty of subjects and, as such, required Parliamentary approval. What was at
issue in this dispute was thus not (in general) whether interests in "government"
could override interests in the liberty and property of subjects or override the
ordinary law, but rather whether matters of government that did so were
properly decided by the king alone or by the king-in-Parliament. From the point
of view of parliamentarians, the danger, of course, was that if the king could
impose duties and fines by prerogative, take property by prerogative, proceed
through the prerogative courts and so forth (and if his reasons for doing so were
"not traversable" by the ordinary courts) the king could, in practice, impose
these burdens for any reason at all and out of all proportion to what the
common good would in fact justify. So long as the king could claim to be acting
for reasons of state, he might impose any burdens on the rights and liberties of

private vessel in time of war or to demand payment in lieu of the ships. But by 1636, it
had become clear that Charles had meant to use the writs-which were now issued to
inland counties as well-as a general and permanent tax. Tanner, English Constitutional
Conflicts at 77 (cited in note 62).
108. Opinion of Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas Sir John Finch in Rex v
Hampden, in Kenyon, ed, Stuart Constitution at 103 (cited in note 56).
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subjects and might do so without those interests of the subject being represented,
as they were in Parliament.'0 9 And especially if the king could raise sufficient
revenues to get on without Parliament, there would be no institution that might
properly mediate between the concerns of government and the rights and liberties
of subjects.
In their desire to establish firm limits to the king's discretionary power,
members of the House of Commons often did appeal to "the law." And sometimes, they claimed, indeed, to be doing no more than defending the existing
municipal law. In the debate on Impositions in 1610, for example, Hakewill
began by declaring that after long consideration and research, he had decided
that the decision of Bate's case was mistaken; and Whitelock argued that
impositions violate even the "municipal law of the land ...the law of property
and private right.""' But these were desperate arguments born of fear-even
Hakewill had been "very confident" of the opinion in Bate's case"'-and they
inevitably led to the extreme conclusion that even "in time of war or other the
greatest necessity or occasion that may be," the king could not lay any impositions on any subject "without assent of Parliament."". More often, the arguments of "law" were made in the context of a bill that would, in fact, change the
existing, expressed law;" 3 for while ordinary courts were bound to the "strictness of the law," Parliament might, and did, appeal to general principles of law
in responding to exercises of the prerogative that were "according to the strictness of law" and "yet grievous."" 4 Moreover, while Parliament often appealed
to "law," the principles of the law to which it appealed included the "natural
frame and constitution of the policy of this kingdom,""' which in turn included Parliament's role as a representative of the interests of subjects.
The claim of "law" was thus often a quite broad one and could refer to the
general right of subjects to enjoy life, liberty and property free from "arbitrary"

109. After the decision in Bate's case, Commons took up the issue of impositions.
James's response was to command the House not to debate the king's prerogative. The
House responded with the Petition of Right, in which it asserted the "ancient, general, and
undoubted right of Parliament to debate freely all matters which do properly concern the
subject and his right or state; which freedom of debate being once foreclosed, the essence
of the liberty of Parliament is withal dissolved." Petition of Right, in Tanner, ed, Constitutional Documents of James I 245, 246 (cited in note 42). The conflict over this point
led to James's dissolving of Parliament.
110. Hakewill's Speech on Impositions in Tanner, ed, Constitutional Documents of
James 1 247, 260-61 (cited in note 42).
111. Id at 248.
112. Id at 259.
113. As I have already noted, even the passage of a statute that increased the jurisdictional authority of common law courts vis-a-vis prerogative courts involved a substantive
change in the "law" (broadly used); for it would affect the degree to which "reasons of
state" would figure into the decision.
114. The phrases are those of Francis Bacon, quoted in Mcllwain, Constitutionalism:
Ancient and Modern at 125 (cited in note 40).
115. From Whitelock's Speech on Impositions in Tanner, ed, Constitutional Documents
of James I at 260 (cited in note 42).
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government. In appealing to law, the parliamentarians were not, then, claiming
that the ordinary law could restrain the power of "government," but rather that,
especially because it could not, it was necessary that matters of government that
directly and significantly imposed upon the property and liberty of subjects
normally be decided by the king-in-Parliament. For only in Parliament were the
subject's interests in property and liberty represented, and only in Parliament
could the determination of whether reasons of state justified particular burdens
on property and liberty properly be made. While many parliamentarians accepted
in principle the right of the king to impose, for certain reasons of state, even substantial burdens on the liberty and property of subjects without Parliamentary
approval, the Stuarts' expansive use of the prerogative highlighted the danger
that, under the guise of these reasons, Parliament's role as an institution where
reasons of government met the property and liberty interests of subjects could
well be destroyed." 6
If the Stuarts' expansive use of the prerogative was increasingly felt to
threaten the property and liberty of subjects, the expanding range of interests of
the great subjects who were represented in Parliament also threatened the realm
of traditional prerogative powers. In areas once thought to be the exclusive
province of the king and his council, the Houses now claimed a voice. Even in
the area of foreign affairs, Commons, beginning in 1621, "discussed ... questions freely, criticized policies advocated by the king, suggested counter policies,"
and while admitting "that the king could make a treaty," "insisted that if the effect of any such treaty constituted a grievance to the people, Parliament must do
its duty and consider the question."".7 James once again asserted the power to
initiate discussion in such areas; but as the direct interests of subjects expanded,
the distinction that Elizabeth had introduced between "matters of the commonwealth" on which anyone might begin discussion and "matters of state" to be
initiated only by the monarch, was becoming more difficult to maintain."' In
its Protestation of December 1621, the Commons thus described its privileges
broadly: to "propound, treat, reason and bring to conclusion" all matters
"concerning the king, state and defence of the realm, and of the Church of
England," as well as "the maintenance and making of laws, and redress of
mischiefs and grievances which daily happen within this realm."" 9
In trying to strengthen Parliament's role as the institution which mediated
between matters of government and the property and liberty of subjects, the
Houses had a limited number of weapons. One, of course, was the power to tax.
However, another weapon which it possessed and which it used to promote its

116. In requisitioning "ship-money," for example, the king-as the historian J.R. Tanner
put it-"claimed to possess the power for the benefit of a conspiracy-threatened commonwealth; it was actually being used by him to force men to pay taxes in an extra-Parliamentary way." Tanner, English Constitutional Conflicts at 272 (cited in note 62).
117. Judson, Crisis of the Constitution at 285 (cited in note 72).

118. See id at 285-86.
119. The Commons' Protestation, December 18, 1621, in Kenyon, ed, Stuart Constitution 42, 42 (cited in note 56).
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conception of Parliament, was its power as a court to try subjects. While the
person of the king was under the jurisdiction of no tribunal, a subject who
violated the rights of other subjects was liable to punishment unless he could
prove that his actions were authorized by law. And beginning in the later years
of James's reign, the Houses increasingly used this power to limit exercises of the
prerogative that imposed what they considered to be unjustifiable burdens on the
property and liberty of subjects. The traditional form of the charge against the
royal officer was that his action had not, in fact, been authorized by the king;
and the charge could thus be made good only if the king was willing to acquiesce
in it and remove his protection from his officer. But as Edmund Morgan has
shown, the Houses (particularly Commons) steadily moved from the claim that
the person of the king had not actually authorized an action of an official to the
quite extreme claim that the "divine king" had not authorized such action even
if the natural person of the king had been mistakenly led to believe (and, indeed,
even if he continued to insist) that he had. For as God's lieutenant, the argument
went, the king could do no wrong. And because "the king in his body politic
always wanted what was best for his subjects," it followed that if the natural
person of the king had, indeed, commanded another to do wrong, this could
only have been because a "host of ambitious schemers.., continually caught the
king's natural ear and misinformed him in order to procure benefits to themselves."' "It was proper for Parliament as the highest tribunal in the land to
punish those who misled the king, to deprive them of the special privileges they
had extracted from him by their lies, to reduce them to the level of other
subjects."' 21 This argument, that certain exercises of the prerogative could not
possibly have been authorized by the "divine" king, in whom was vested absolute power to act for the underlying salus populi, was, of course, simply a
backhanded way of asserting that those actions could only be authorized by the
king-in-Parliament. In punishing royal officials, who claimed to be acting in the
king's name and for the common good, for violations of the liberty and property
of subjects, the Houses were thus, once again, appealing to "law"; but, again,
doing so as part of an attempt to strengthen what they considered to be
Parliament's constitutional role as a mediating body.
The deep conflict between the king and the Houses over the role of Parliament could, however, hardly be resolved by such measures. There is no need here
to recount the events leading to the outbreak of civil war or to discuss the particular conflicts after the restoration that led to the Glorious Revolution. But
what is relevant for our discussion are the consequences of the long battles that
ensued, bloody and bloodless, for the structure of the constitutional order.
The first fundamental consequence was a change in the conception of the

120. Edmund Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in
England and America 30 (Norton, 1988). As one member of Commons said, if "for want
of" "faithfull counsell" the king had commanded his officers to "doe anie thing against
the law, their guilt and punishment is not lessened but aggravated by his command." Id
at 34.
121. Morgan, Inventing the People at 31 (cited in note 120).
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role of the Houses within Parliament. While in the years before the outbreak of
civil war, Parliament was still talked about as divided between the king as ruling
element and the Houses as representatives of subjects,1 22 with the advent of
civil war, the Houses would begin to claim explicitly a share in the ruling power
and to do so (particularly Commons) as representatives of "the people."1 23 And
with the Glorious Revolution, the conception of Parliament as composed, not of
a ruler on one side and subjects on the other, but of three ruling elements-king,
lords and commons-would become the new constitutional orthodoxy. The
second fundamental consequence concerned the relationship of Parliament as an
institution to the prerogative power. Especially after the Glorious Revolution, the
Houses (again, particularly Commons), would, on behalf of Parliament and the
nation embodied within it, steadily move to limit the prerogative power of the
king. The battle over the prerogative would continue over the course of more
than six decades, but by the middle of the eighteenth century, the basic constitutional transformation would be largely complete and the relationship between
Parliament and the prerogative resolved in the complete domination of Parliament. Ultimate political authority would now be said to be seated in one
institution: the institution in which the whole of the people or the nation was
embodied.
These institutional and constitutional transformations would eventually be
quite significant for the conflict between Britain and the American colonies. And
it is one of the many ironies of the colonial relationship that the colonists saw in
the Glorious Revolution and in the struggles by the Houses of Parliament over
the ensuing six decades to reduce the prerogative power, not, on the whole, a
threat to their privileges of self-government, but a confirmation of it. The
Glorious Revolution itself had a profound impact within the colonies, where the
struggle was viewed as one between the liberties of English subjects everywhere
and the prerogative power of the king."' And indeed, English policy toward

122. This is a shorthand way of putting it. Technically, of course, Commons sat as

representatives of subjects, while the Lords sat in their own right.
123. The language of "the people" and popular sovereignty had a mixed history in
seventeenth and eighteenth century English rhetoric. Although the language of popular
sovereignty was common during the later years of the reign of Charles I and during the
period of the interregnum, after the restoration, and in large part because of the reaction
against the government of the Commonwealth which had claimed to represent the people,
the language of popular sovereignty was much less used. Morgan, Inventing the People:
ch 1-5 (cited in note 120). In eighteenth-century Britain, the term "the people" might be
used to describe the "better sorts" to whom the responsibilities of government should be
entrusted, or, alternatively, might be used in distinction to the aristocracy and gentry. And
at the time of the Reform Bill of 1832, the term was often used to describe the middle
and lower classes. C.S. Emden, The People and the Constitution, 317-20 (Oxford, 2d ed
1956).
124. After rumors of William's successful "invasion" landed on New England shores,
colonists in Massachusetts staged their own successful rebellion against Edmund
Andros-the governor of the recently established Dominion of New England-and restored
their previous system of government without a charter. Other New England colonies followed suit, falling back on their pre-Dominion forms of political organization. In Mary-
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the colonies subsequent to the Glorious Revolution could easily be interpreted by
the colonists in this light. While William and Mary and their successors continued to attempt to insure that the colonies were being administered for the sake
of the realm, the Glorious Revolution in fact resulted in a general increase in the
power of localities both inside and outside England, and the colonies found
themselves enjoying a period of increased local autonomy over their own internal
affairs.'" Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, there were various proposals within Parliament to intervene in the internal administration of the
colonies, but these proposals were largely abandoned, as it was widely believed
that the costs of provoking opposition were likely to outweigh any benefits the
policies might bring.' And although Parliament continued to assert in principle its right to legislate for the colonies, during the first half of the eighteenth
century, colonial political leaders saw in Parliament less a threat to self-government than a source of protection from royal officials.
By the 1760s, however, the greatest threat to colonial autonomy began to
appear from Parliament itself; and the expansion in the institutional power of
Parliament would take on a very different valence.
C

The political and economic context within which the particular constitutional
conflicts between center and colonies developed in the mid-eighteenth century is
complex, and I shall not endeavor here to discuss that context in any detail. We
might just note, however, three developments of this period that are particularly
relevant for our concerns. First, as already noted, Parliamentary supremacy
within Britain was, during this period, becoming well-settled. Second, colonial
economies had by this period become quite prosperous, fueled in significant part
by various illegal trading avenues and smuggling activities, and assisted by a
generally lax system of customs enforcement. At the same time, one of the
consequences of their increasing prosperity was that the colonies (particularly the
New England colonies) had come to serve as a lucrative market for British manufactured goods; and with colonial manufacturing and trade hampered by
mercantilist regulations (despite the weak enforcement of customs regulations),
the colonies had, since 1755, begun to find themselves with a balance of trade

land and New York, revolutionary governments "proclaimed" William and Mary, and
having unseated the existing authorities, carried on, along with New England, for some
time without any formal charter or royal organization. Shortly after their ascension to the
throne, William and Mary thus found themselves, in the words of the historian David
Lovejoy, "presented with a number of colonial governments in America that they were
unaware they had lost." David Lovejoy, The Glorious Revolution in America, 270
(Wesleyan, 1972). Indeed, as Lovejoy puts it, "England's revolution was imported by its
colonists before some Englishmen had accepted it at home." Id. The colonists had
enthusiastically joined the struggle with their brethren in England who had not been entirely aware that they were united in such a fraternity.
125. Greene, Peripheries and Center at 62-63 (cited in note 17).
126. Id at 61.
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deficit, financed by credit from British merchants. Colonial attempts to improve
their financial situation through monetary and other policies were met by a series
of Parliamentary enactments concerning debt, bankruptcy, coinage and paper
currency that were meant to protect the interests of British merchants." 7 And
in the early 1760s, Parliament passed a new series of navigation acts and
customs regulations and reorganized the customs service in an effort to insure
that the colonies, whose interests in many respects had begun increasingly to
appear at odds with the interests of the realm, continued to serve the needs of
the British economy. Third, in the midst of this, and following the cessation of
hostilities with France, the question began to be raised within Britain of how the
costs of empire should be allocated between the center and the colonies. The
ministry's answer was a series of policies designed to increase revenue through
new customs duties, stricter enforcement of existing duties (including the increased use of vice-admiralty courts) and direct impositions, such as the Quartering Act of 1765 (which required the colonies to furnish provisions for royal
troops stationed within their borders) and the Stamp Act.
There is certainly room for speculation about how the emerging issues of the
period might have been dealt with by a more skillful and sensitive ministry. But
as the center began to impose more severe regulations on trade and on the
colonial economies, and as it began to demand that the colonies pay a larger
share of the costs of empire, it pressed the issue that had long divided center and
colonies: of the basic constitutional relationship between them. If the conflict
over that issue had been a longstanding one, it would now, however, take on a
new form, one that would involve competing interpretations of the significance
of the changes in the institutional relationship between Parliament and the king.
The conflict, as it now appeared, would be, that is to say, specifically over the
constitutional relationship between Parliament, now the sovereign power within
Britain, and the rest of the empire.
From the perspective of the colonists in the 1760s, the institutional developments that had taken place within Britain in the three-quarters of a century
following the Glorious Revolution had not substantially affected the basic constitutional relationship between the colonies and the center. In fact, in an important
sense, the colonists could believe that these developments had strengthened their
longstanding claim that certain kinds of issues were, by right, within the province
of local institutions. In the eyes of many colonists, Parliament's struggle to limit
the prerogative power within Britain and the struggle of colonial assemblies to
limit the prerogative in the colonies had been parallel battles, each fought in the
name of the rights and liberties of subjects. And the triumph of Parliamentary
power over the prerogative was widely interpreted by colonists as a realization
of the principle that property could be taken, and (other) rights and liberties of
subjects limited, only for the common good as determined by representative
institutions. In the mid-eighteenth century, this principle of representation-that
"the subjects"' were "bound only by such laws to which they themselves con-

127. Andrews, Colonial Background at 115 (cited in note 19).
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sent"-came to be regarded by the colonists as, indeed, the very foundation and
"chief excellency of the British Constitution." 2 Of course, the general constitutional principle of representation did not, standing alone, logically imply any
right to local representation or any other particular form of representation. The
colonists, however, argued that for certain purposes, the proper unit of representation was necessarily local. In making that claim, the colonists argued that they
could not adequately be represented in Parliament; and as well, they continued
to appeal both to their charters-which, it was claimed, had become settled by
"ancient usage and custom"-and to their "inherent rights" as distinct (if
dependent) political societies founded on consent. And from these two general
premises-that representation was the fundamental principle of the British
constitution and that, for certain purposes, the requisite unit of representation
was local-the colonists drew the following conclusion: that the imperial constitution was necessarily a federalist one, a constitution of various relatively
self-governing peoples under a common sovereign.
However, if the colonists had consistently defended the view that, for certain
matters, the proper locus of political power was local, crown officials and
Parliament had just as consistently held a different view: that fundamental authority over the colonies rested with the center, and that all privileges of
self-government were conditional devolutions of power by grace which continued
at the favor of the center. And from the perspective of Parliament, the changing
relationship between Parliament and the king hardly changed this constitutional
fact. From this perspective, the triumph over the prerogative meant that Parliament was now the sovereign power, not only within the realm, but within the
whole of the empire; and in the view of many in Parliament, it was, in fact, this
principle, of Parliamentary sovereignty, that was the fundamental principle of the
British constitution.' Indeed, if colonists could see in the growth of Parliamentary power a strengthening of their claims *to self-government, members of
Parliament could well regard the consolidation of sovereign power within that
institution as solidifying the power of the center over the colonies. For when
power had been divided between king and Parliament, the colonists could claim
(with some support from the king) that the particular power of Parliament over
the colonies was limited. At the same time, while asserting themselves to be under the sovereign power of the king, the colonists could seek to limit the power
of the prerogative by arguing (mirroring the parliamentarians' "de modo" claim)
that for certain kinds of issues, the royal power was properly exercised through
the "king-in-legislature"-in this case, the "king-in-colonial-legislatures."
Through the opening between the power of the king and the power of Parliament, the colonies could thus attempt to protect their claim to a certain measure

128. Thomas Fitch, et al, Reasons Why the British Colonies in America Should Not Be
Charged With Internal Taxes (1764), reprinted in Bernard Bailyn, ed, 1 Pamphlets of the
American Revolution: 17S0-1776 386, 386 (Harvard, 1965).
129. The claim that Parliamentary sovereignty was the fundamental principle of the British constitution was not universally held. See John Phillip Reid, 1 ConstitutionalHistory
of the American Revolution: The Authority of Rights 76-77, 104 (Wisconsin, 1991).
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of self-government against the center. But the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty
was patently incompatible with any such claims. For if, as Parliamentary spokesmen claimed, "there must be in every State one supreme Legislative Jurisdiction";
and if in Great Britain "this one Supreme Legislature is the British Parliament,"
the power of colonial legislatures must necessarily be subordinate.13 From the
perspective of a Parliament that claimed to be sovereign, the colonial view that
certain matters were of right within the province of local legislatures amounted,
then, either to an assertion of independence or to the "political solecism" of
imperium in imperio.
As we have seen, despite the longstanding differences between the constitutional theory of the center and that of the colonists, an accommodation of sorts
had prevailed, in which each side continued to maintain its view of the constitutional order while, in general, pursuing a strategy that did not force the
issue. In the 1760s, the more conciliatory elements within the British government, within Parliament and within the colonies, aware of the deep divisions between the center's and the colonists' view of the constitutional order, continued
to urge such a course. And, in some respects, Parliament's repeal of the Stamp
Act and its tempering of some of the harsher provisions of the Sugar Act could
be seen to follow the traditional pattern. Those acts had been opposed, not only
by colonists, but as well by British merchant-creditors who feared a diminution
of trade (especially in the light of colonial boycotts) and the draining of precious
specie from the debt-ridden colonies. And once again, the center's adoption, for
pragmatic reasons, of a more lenient policy was accompanied by an assertion of
complete authority over the colonies-in this case, the Declaratory Act. But if in
form these events continued, to some extent, an old pattern, the conflict between
the constitutional view of the center and that of the colonists would not this time
be so easily resolved. Within important sectors of the maturing colonial economies, the protections afforded by the special relationship to the mother country
were increasingly outweighed by the costs of central regulations. And as Parliament moved beyond issues of trade to the allocation of the costs of empire,
Parliamentary policies increasingly appeared to the colonists to threaten the very
existence of a meaningful realm of colonial self-government.
For the colonists, there were two conditions necessary for the preservation
of such a realm. First, it was necessary that there be a recognized distinction between matters that were properly within the realm of local authority and matters
that were properly within the realm of central authority. By the mid-eighteenth
century, colonists had commonly come to articulate the distinction between these
realms of authority in terms of a distinction between "internal" and "external"
matters. The internal-external language was actually used by colonists in several
different ways. It was sometimes used to describe the content of the distinction
between local and central authority. One way in which colonists sometimes
conceived of this distinction was in physical or geographical terms: "internal"

130. Sir Egerton Leigh, quoted in John Phillip Reid 3 Constitutional History of the
American Revolution: The Authority to Legislate 75 (Wisconsin, 1991).
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regulations were, in this sense, regulations imposed inside the colonies, while
"external" regulations were those imposed at or beyond the borders. This
account of the distinction between local authority and central authority was not
an entirely accurate reflection of constitutional practice-restrictions on American manufacturing, for example, which the colonists had, for the most part, long
accepted, were certainly "internal" regulations in this sense-but it could
nonetheless be maintained as a very rough and general description of the constitutional relationship between the colonies and the center so long as such "internal" central regulations were sufficiently few and relatively unobtrusive. An
alternative formulation of the substantive distinction between local and central
power also used the language of "internal" and "external." On this conception,
the distinction was between matters that directly concerned relations between
parts of the empire-"external" relations as it was often put, and which most
centrally included issues of trade-and those that did not. (This conception of
the distinction between central and local authority overlapped with the geographical one, and there was plenty of room for conflating the two.) But in addition
to characterizing the content of the distinction between local and central authority, the internal-external language could be used to refer simply to the distinction
itself; that is, to the distinction between a realm of local or "internal" authority,
whatever it included, and a realm of central or "external" authority. And as a
matter of constitutional theory, this was the most essential distinction. The
precise substantive character of local authority might be conceived in various
ways, and might, although it need not, be understood in the spatial terms that
the internal-external language suggested. But the very possibility of colonial selfgovernment depended on the existence of a distinct realm of local authority-on
a distinction between matters that were properly decided "internally" and matters, that might be decided by central authorities.
If a distinction between matters properly within the realm of local authority
and those properly within the realm of central authority was necessary for the
existence of colonial self-government, it was, however, not sufficient. As we have
noted, because of the very nature of colonialism, the relationship between local
authority and central authority was necessarily one of overlapping, rather than
mutually exclusive, realms. And because of this, even "external" regulations
(however conceived), if severe enough, could well subvert the ability of colonists
to exercise a meaningful degree of autonomy over their own affairs. If the first
condition necessary for (meaningful) colonial self-government was thus a distinction between internal and external matters, the second was the preservation of
a proper balance between the two. And in the eyes of colonists, each of these
would be threatened by Parliament's claim of sovereignty. The very claim of
complete authority over the colonies "in all cases whatsoever"'31 denied any
inherent realm of local authority. And Parliamentary policies undertaken in the

131. The Declaratory Act (1766), reprinted in Jack P. Greene, Colonies to Nation:
1763-1789: A Documentary History of the American Revolution 84, 84-85 (Norton,
1975).
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spirit of that sovereignty, whether or not they directly challenged the distinction
between internal and external matters, appeared to the colonists to threaten the
balance between local and central power.
Perhaps the most direct and forceful threat to the distinction between a
realm of local and a realm of central authority, at least in the earlier years of the
period between the end of the wars with France and the American Revolution,
appeared in the form of the Stamp Act. The Stamp Act simultaneously challenged at least three different ways in which colonists had articulated the
distinction between local and central authority. First, the Stamp Act clearly
threatened the distinction between local and central authority understood in
geographical terms, for the tax that it imposed appeared as geographically
"internal." Second, the Stamp Act threatened the idea that the power of Parliament was limited to imposing "indirect" customs duties as opposed to "direct"
impositions. And third, and most importantly, because the purpose of the Stamp
Act was to raise revenue, it directly challenged the idea that the power to raise
revenue was exclusively within the authority of local governments. While colonial
assemblies and advocates had maintained that local institutions possessed
complete authority over "internal" matters, they had not often articulated
precisely what that meant, and they did not always clearly differentiate between,
for example, these three different conceptions of the distinction between local
and central authority; for in many cases, these distinctions had, in practice,
mapped onto each other. But in simultaneously threatening each of these conceptions of the distinction between local and central authority, the Stamp Act
represented, for the colonists, a fundamental challenge to the very idea of a
division of authority between local and central institutions.
The Stamp Act was, at the level of principle, an easy case for the colonists
precisely because it challenged directly, and in such a deep way, the distinction
between local and central authority. And in the desire to try to protect a realm
of local authority, the temptation of colonists was to assert a sharp distinction
between that which fell within and that which fell outside of their authority, and
to articulate that distinction in terms that could be relatively easily applied in
practice-for example, between customs duties and "direct" impositions. But
relying too heavily on such distinctions was dangerous; customs duties, for
example, if abused, could destroy a colonial self-government as effectively as any
direct imposition. As John Dickinson argued in 1767-68, if the Stamp Act was
"unconstitutional" and "destructive to the liberty of these colonies," no less so
were the Townshend duties, though they did their work by placing an "external"
duty on essential articles."' Or as Thomas Hutchinson himself put it, the
"fallacy" of relying on a distinction between "internal" and "external" impositions was that it
suppos[ed] duties upon trade to be imposed for the sake of regulating

132. John Dickinson, Letters From a Farmer, 2 Life and Writings of John Dickinson
328-35 (Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1895).
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trade, whereas the Professed design of the duties by the late act is to raise
a revenue.... [Parliament] might find duties on trade enough to drain us
so thoroughly that it will not be possible to pay internal taxes as a revenue
to them or even to support government within ourselves.'
Dickinson thus argued (as Daniel Dulany had done several years earlier in
the context of the passage of the 1764 Sugar Act) that the important distinction
was not the form of the act, but whether its purpose was to regulate trade or to
3 4 But
raise revenue.Y
this criterion, as Dickinson well recognized, was difficult
to apply in practice. Parliament might well "retain" the "forms of liberty," while
nonetheless destroying the "substance"; and in "government as well as in
religion, 'The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.""3.s The real problem,
then, was that Parliament was acting in a spirit, not of federalism, but of
sovereignty; and even if Parliament did not directly challenge the realm of local
authority, as it had in the Stamp Act, it could destroy any meaningful degree of
colonial self-government by pressing too far, and for the wrong reasons, the
powers that even the colonists acknowledged that it had. Just as the mixed
constitution in Britain could be destroyed by abuse of the royal power to appoint
peers, so too, Dickinson argued, could the balanced constitution of the empire be
destroyed, for example, by Parliament's employing its power to restrict manufacturing and then imposing customs duties to raise revenue. Although Parliament
"unquestionably possesses a legal authority to regulate the trade of Great-Britain
and all her colonies,"' once Parliament begins to "lay duties upon her exportations to us" for the purpose of revenue, "she then will have nothing to do but
to lay those duties on articles which she prohibits us to manufacture-and the
tragedy of American liberty is finished."

37

If Parliament's enactment of new customs duties and other impositions for
the purpose of raising revenue threatened, in the eyes of colonists, to destroy the
balance between central and local power, the threat appeared to colonists as well
in a series of additional acts, most of which were adopted as part of the general
effort to enforce the revenue acts, but which burdened other important colonial
rights and liberties. The threat to the constitutional balance thus also appeared
in such exercises of central power as the closing of ports, the stationing of troops
in colonial towns, and the use of writs of assistance as general search warrants.
It appeared in Parliament's direct interference with local government; for example, in its suspension of the New York legislature for failing to vote all of the

133. Letter to Ebenezer Silliman, quoted in Edmund S. Morgan and Helen M. Morgan,
The Stamp Act Crisis 226 (North Carolina, 3d ed 1962). The reference was drawn to my
attention by Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 212
(Harvard, enlarged ed 1992), which quotes a shorter portion of the letter.
134. Dickinson, Letters from a Farmer 312-16; 328-35 (cited in note 132). See also
Daniel Dulany, Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British Colonies
(1765), reprinted in Bailyn, ed, 1 Pamphlets 608, 637 (cited in note 128).
135. Dickinson, Letters From a Fanner at 347 (cited in note 132) (emphasis in original).
136. Id at 312.
137. Id at 320.
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supplies required by the Quartering Act of 1765, and in its altering of the
Massachusetts constitution and its suspension of Massachusetts town meetings
in 1774. And it appeared as well in a number of regulations that shifted responsibility for the administration of justice from institutions that were more responsive to local concerns to centrally-administered bodies. The Revenue Act of 1764
(the Sugar Act), for example, limited the personal liability of custom officials for
their actions in enforcing customs regulations; and three years after the passage
of that act, Parliament established a new set of Vice-Admiralty Courts to hear
customs cases. Such courts, which bypassed local juries, took "away the ancient
right of being judged only by peers"; and the power of such courts to grant
immunity to officials from a common law suit (on a showing that they were
acting for "probable cause") further "weaken[ed]," in the eyes of colonists, "the
best Security of our Lives, Liberties and Estates."' 38 The Administration of
Justice Act, enacted in 1774, limited local control over royal officials yet further
by providing for the removal to England for trial of any magistrate, customs
officer or person acting under the authority of either, who was indicted for a
capital offense while in execution of his duty to suppress riots or to enforce the
revenue laws.
While some of these acts, standing alone, may well have evoked colonial
protests, collectively they represented a fundamental threat to the balance
between central and local power. The objection to most of these measures was
not that they were inherently outside of the realm of central authority, but rather
that they were excessive exercises of that authority; and in many cases, given
their underlying purpose, that they were outright abuses of that authority. Thus,
while they maintained the "forms" of legitimate central power, they were, in
Dickinson's words, destroying the "substance" of "American liberty." As
Dickinson said in the context of the suspension of the New York legislature, the
problem was not that the legislature had a right to meet; for various reasons the
Crown might legitimately "have restrained the Governor of New-York, even
from calling the Assembly together, by its prerogative in the royal governments."
The real problem was that the suspension had been imposed by Parliament and
for an illegitimate reason; it was being used "to COMPEL New-York into a
submission of" unconstitutional Parliamentary "authority."' 3 9 Similarly, the
problem with the use of Vice-Admiralty Courts was not that such courts represented an inherently illegitimate use of central power. As John Phillip Reid has
noted, the use of such courts was probably necessary if Parliament was going to
have any of its trade acts enforced, and such courts had existed for seventy-five
years in the colonies without raising "constitutional issues, for Parliament had
promulgated them by virtue of its constitutional authority to regulate imperial
trade.""'4 But the increased use-and in the eyes of many colonial merchants,

138. Reid, 1 Constitutional History 51-53 (cited in note 129). The second quotation is
from the Instructions of Boston, 18 September 1765, cited by Reid.
139. Dickenson, Letters from a Farmer at 310 (cited in note 132).
140. Reid, 1 Constitutional History 52 (cited in note 129).
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abuse" 4'-of such courts to enforce controversial customs measures, and the
power of these courts to grant immunity to royal officers from common law
suits, appeared to colonists as a dangerous extension of central power. The jury
itself functioned as a representative of the community's sense of justice; and
without a jury, "legislative and judicial mandates" could not "be tempered to
conform to a local constitutional consensus."' 42 Colonial defendants would
thus be subject to the judgment of "[e]nglish common lawyers appointed by
London" who had "a greater attachment to imperial rule" than to "impartial"
justice,14 and the community would be at the mercy of royal agents and soldiers who would be held accountable to no local tribunal. Taken together, these
policies, pursued in the spirit of Parliamentary sovereignty, appeared to colonists
as a broad-scale assault on colonial self-government and part of a program to
centralize power in Parliament, a body "who cannot be supposed to have the
144
least care or concern for" the colonists' "real interest."
The colonists' fears, it goes without saying, were not assuaged by the
ministry's reaction to their complaints. In responding to the colonial claim of a
right to self-government and to the claim that the power of Parliament was
limited to managing trade and other general affairs of the empire, representatives
of the center reasserted the completeness of Parliamentary sovereignty: that the
power of Parliament was "absolute, uncontrollable, and accountable to
'
none";"' that it was "supreme, absolute and unlimited,"; 46
that it entailed
the "full power and authority to make laws and statutes.., to bind the colonies
and people of America ... in all cases whatsoever"; 147 and that "no Line...
can be drawn between the supreme Authority of Parliament and the total
Independence of the Colonies."' 4' And to the colonists' claim that they were

141. Vice-Admiralty Courts had the power to issue certificates that a custom official,
even if wrong in his seizure of a vessel and its wares, acted with "probable cause," which
would immunize the official from a civil suit. Colonial merchants commonly complained
that this power was abused. See for example, Henry Laurens, Extracts from the Proceedings of the Court of Vice-Admiralty, reprinted in Merrill Jensen, ed, Tracts of the
American Revolution 185-206 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1967).
142. Reid, 1 Constitutional History 51-52 (cited in note 129). As Professor Reid notes,
not only did juries enforce a "local constitutional consensus" to "protect local citizens
from imperial prosecutions," but also to punish "royal officials 'guilty' of enforcing
'unconstitutional' imperial law." Id at 53.
143. Id at 51.
144. The Votes and Proceedings of the Freeholders and other Inhabitants of the Town
of Boston, In Town Meeting assembled, According to Law, reprinted as A State of the
Right of Colonies 241, in Jensen, ed, Tracts (cited in note 141).
145. Governor Francis Bernard, Principles of Law and Polity, Applied to the Government of the British Colonies in America reprinted in Greene, ed, Colonies to Nation 9,
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Constitutional History 48 (cited in note 130).
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148. Address of Governor Hutchinson in The Speeches of His Excellency Governor
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not represented in Parliament, and that the colonies stood towards Parliament
only as self-governing corporate entities, Parliamentary spokesmen responded
that Parliament's power came from its representing all the subjects of the empire
as such. True, it was said, the colonists did not themselves elect members of
49
Parliament, but neither were "Nine Tenths of the People of Britain Electors,"
and like them, the colonists could nonetheless be "virtually" represented in Parliament.
It is important to see how this argument of virtual representation was
connected to the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty: how it was, indeed, a
conclusion from that idea. The argument of virtual representation did not begin
from a thesis about what would constitute proper representation; rather, it began
with the premise that "the King in Parliament,is the sole and absolute sovereign
of the whole British Empire,"'"0 and then asked what form of representation
would be compatible with that sovereignty. Because the colonists could not be
represented directly-by virtue of their distance, "the right of having a share in
the Imperial Legislature" was simply "impracticable"' 5 -the colonists had to
be represented virtually. The point made by Parliamentary spokesmen that most
Britons within the realm did not choose their representatives simply went to
show that virtual representation was not an impossible form of representation.
For the colonists, however, for whom the fundamental principle of the
constitution was the principle of representation, the issue did not begin with
Parliamentary supremacy, but with the question of proper representation itself.
As subjects, the colonists argued, they could not properly be represented within
a Parliament whose members they had no share in electing; and the idea of
virtual representation was thus a "fiction of law,"" 2 a "Phantasie," a "'farfetched' notion of 'late date' that had been fabricated for the sole purpose of
arguing the colonists 'out of their civil rights."" 3 True enough, the colonists
recognized, most subjects in Great Britain did not themselves participate in
electing representatives; but, as a number of colonists argued, most notably,
Daniel Dulany, while in Britain "the interests of the non-electors, the electors
and the representatives, are individually the same ... [such that the] security of

held on the Sixth of January, 1773. With the Answers of His Majesty's Council and the
House of Representatives Respectively, reprinted with corrections and commentary in John
Phillip Reid, ed, The Briefs of the American Revolution 20 (NYU, 1981).
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151. Id at 10-11.
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the non-electors against oppression, is that their oppression will fall also upon
the electors ....
[t]here is not that intimate and inseparable relation between the
electors of Great Britain and the inhabitants of the colonies ... ; on the con-

trary, not a single actual elector in England might be immediately affected by a
taxation in America.""5 4 While Parliament could thus be trusted to weigh the
overall good of a policy against the burdens that it imposed on subjects within
Britain, it could not be trusted to do the same with respect to the rights and
liberties of the colonists, for these rights and liberties Parliament could not adequately represent. For colonists, then, who began with the issue of representation, the question was not what form of representation was compatible with
Parliamentary sovereignty, but whether Parliamentary sovereignty over the whole
of the empire was compatible with just representation. And their answer, of
course, was that it was not.
The criticism of virtual representation was not that Parliament would impose
burdens for the sake of harming colonial interests; the criticism was rather that
Parliament would be insufficiently sensitive to the burdens its policies imposed
on the colonists. This argument against Parliament's having fundamental authority over all matters of governance throughout the empire was grounded deeply in
English constitutional thought; in an important sense, it was simply a new
version of the argument made by the parliamentarians themselves against the
royal prerogative: that property and liberty could only be harmed for the
common good and that the question of what burdens were justified by the
common good could only be properly determined by a body that represented the
interests of subjects. Just as the prerogative power, it was feared by seventeenthcentury parliamentarians, would be used to take property and restrict liberty in
ways not genuinely for the common good, so the danger now was that Parliament, in acting for what it took to be the common good, would fail to give
proper respect to the interests of colonial subjects. Does a member of Parliament
"know us? Or we him?" Arthur Lee asked. "Have we any restrictions over his
conduct? ... Is he bound in duty and interest to preserve our liberty and
property? ... Is he acquainted with our circumstances, wants &c.?""'5 Because
Parliament did not, and could not properly represent tle liberty and property of
colonists and because it considered the common good only from the point of
view of the center, the consequences of Parliamentary government were clear: the
subversion of liberty and "taxes without end."' Rather than being a coordinating power in a federalist constitution of empire, Parliament would become the
legislature for the whole, absorbing the colonists into the realm as second-class
subjects.

154. Daniel Dulany, Considerations, in Bailyn, ed, Pamphlets 608, 615 (cited in note
128). See also James Wilson, Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative
Authority of the British Parliament in Robert McCloskey, ed, 2 The Works of James
Wilson 726 (Harvard, 1967).
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James Otis's influential pamphlet, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved described the constitutional relationship between the colonies and
the center in a way that was, indeed, remarkably homologous to the arguments
of seventeenth century parliamentarians against the prerogative power. Just as,
in the period of the early Stuarts, it was axiomatic that all authority was in "the
king," so did Otis similarly accept that "as over subordinate governments, the
Parliament of Great Britain has an undoubted power and lawful authority to
make Acts for the general good, that by naming them, shall and ought to be
equally binding, as upon the subjects of Great Britain within the realm.""5 7 But
in the same breath in which parliamentarians asserted the absolute power of the
king, they also asserted that no man's property can be taken without his consent,
that (in the words of Coke) "Magna Carta is such a fellow, that he will have no
sovereign,";' s and similarly did Otis claim that "no parts of His Majesty's
dominions can be taxed without their consent."" 9 For the parliamentarians,
the possibility of reconciling the absolute power of government and the rights of
subjects lay in the institution of the king-in-Parliament; and so, too, did Otis
argue that if the colonies were to be taxed by Parliament, they would need to be
represented "in some proportion to their number and estateg, in the grand
legislature of the nation." 6 ' Moreover, just as the parliamentarians responded
to exercises of the prerogative that they regarded as violative of their liberties
and property in part by using Parliament's own power as a court to drive a
wedge between the king's two bodies, so, too, did Otis, in a rather interesting
move, attempt to respond to the policies of a Parliament that did not represent
the colonists and that, Otis believed, violated the colonists' liberty and property,
by driving a wedge between what might be called Parliament's two bodies. While
asserting that "the power of Parliament is uncontroulable, but by themselves,
and we must obey,"' 6' Otis insisted-repeating a classic constitutional distinction-that "absolute and arbitrary is a contradiction."
Parliament are in all cases to declare what is for the good of the whole; but
it is not the declaration that makes it so.... Should an Act of Parliament
be against any of His natural laws, which are immutably true, their declaration would be contrary to eternal truth, equity, and justice, and consequently void: and so it would be adjudged by the Parliament itself, when
convinced of their mistake. Upon this great principle, Parliaments repeal
such Acts, as soon as they have been mistaken, in having declared them to
62
be for the public good, when in fact they were not so.
But suppose that Parliament did not recognize or repeal its "mistaken" act?
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When such mistake is evident and palpable ... the judges of the executive

courts have declared the Act 'of a whole Parliament' void.' ... See here the
grandeur of the British constitution.... If the supreme legislative errs, it is
informed by the supreme executive in the King's courts of law.163
While thus recognizing Parliament's "absolute" power, Otis suggested that the
"supreme legislature" and the courts act as "a perpetual check and balance to
each other." ' 64 And the two seemingly disparate ideas were made compatible
under just the same rationale that earlier parliamentarians had used for explaining how it was that punishing an officer of the king who was carrying out the
king's command (even as confirmed by the person of the king himself) was
nonetheless in obedience to the king. Just as the parliamentarians had argued
that, because the king "is just, so we doubt not but he doth justly intend to
performe,"' similarly Otis argued that, in upholding "eternal truth, equity,
and justice" the king's courts would in fact be upholding the genuine will of
Parliament itself.
The suggestion was, however, hardly plausible. Punishing the king's officers
for carrying out the direct commands of the person of the king was a symptom
of constitutional crisis, not the foundation of a stable constitutional order. And
relying on the king's courts to mediate between a non-representative-Parliament's
conception of the needs of the realm and the property and liberty interests of the
colonists was an equally strained solution. Even under the fantastic supposition
that the crown would have allowed royal courts to assume such a role, it would
necessarily be limited, as Otis suggested, to "evident and palpable" mistakes.
The problem was far deeper and it consisted in the fact that, because
colonists were not actually represented in Parliament,' 66 Parliament was not
capable of properly representing their interests and could not be counted on to
act "for their good."' 67 The alternative to representation was federalism. But
in the eyes of many colonists, Parliamentary policies threatened the balance
between central and local power and with it the existence of a meaningful realm
of colonial self-government. And without such a realm, colonists would be left
with only the hope that Parliament would come to share their concerns and
protect their interests; and it was, the colonists believed, a vain hope that "Life,
Liberty [and] Property... will be effectually secured by a Government, which
the Proprietors of them have no Power in the Direction of, and over which they
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have no Power or Influence whatever."168
In response to Parliament's assertions of an authority "supreme, absolute and
unlimited," and to the difficulty in offering a clear distinction between central
and local authority that did not itself depend for its preservation on Parliament's
adopting a federalist "spirit," colonial advocates were forced to make increasingly severe claims about the constitutional position of the colonies. In the years
immediately preceding the American Revolution, many colonial advocates thus
came to describe the relationship of the colonies to Britain as that of essentially
two states under a common king. Under this conception, the relationship
between the colonies and Britain was something like the relationship between
Scotland and England had been in the century between the unification of the
crown in James I (James VI of Scotland) and the union of the two kingdoms in
1707.169 As James Madison put it a quarter century after the revolution:
[T]he fundamental principle of the Revolution
coirdinate members with each other and Great
by a common executive sovereign, and that
maintained1 to
be as complete in each American
7
parliament. 1

was that the colonies were
Britain of an empire united
the legislative power was
parliament as in the British

As a matter of historical practice, this view of the constitutional relationship
was, at the very least, debatable. Parliament had long been a participant in
governing the empire; since the mid-seventeenth century, it had regulated trade
with the colonies through a series of navigation acts and other related measures,
restricted manufacturing of various goods, prohibited private banks of issue, and
regulated the issuing of legal tender and the value of foreign coins.' 7 ' And
while there had been some opposition in the colonies to such measures,1 72 and
while colonists sought to circumvent those regulations that were most onerous,
in general the colonists had come to accept Parliament's power to "model the
1 73
Trade of the whole Empire, so as to subserve the Interest of her own."
Some colonial advocates, however, now simply denied that the colonists had
ever accepted any central authority over them and claimed that earlier regula-
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tions had been approved by colonial assemblies at the "request" of the king.174
Others denied only that Parliament had ever had any authority over them and
characterized the early Parliamentary regulations as enactments of the king,
consented to by the king's subject's in Parliament, and then accepted by the colonists, either explicitly through their legislatures or implicitly through practice.
According to this view, while the center did have power to impose regulations in
the interests of the realm and in the interests of the empire, that power rested
with the king alone, who was responsible for maintaining the relations between
the various entities that made up the empire. 7 As James Wilson argued in
1774, the "dependence of the Americans" on Great Britain is not as subjects of
the Kingdom, but "as subjects of the King of Great Britain" and
[flrom this dependence.., arises a strict connexion between the inhabitants of Great Britain and those of America. They are fellow subjects; they
are under allegiance to the same prince.... To the king is intrusted the direction and management of the great machine of government. He therefore
is fittest to adjust the different wheels, and to regulate their motions in
such a manner as to co-operate in the same general designs. ... The
connection and harmony between Great Britain and us, which it is her
interest and ours mutually to cultivate, and on which her prosperity, as
well as ours, so materially depends, will be better preserved by the operation of the legal prerogatives of the crown, than by the exertion of an
unlimited authority by parliament.17
This was an awkward argument. If the colonists were to concede that the king
had power to regulate the affairs of the empire, they were left to explain-as
John Adams, who saw the difficulty, put it-why it was that " that authority [is]
lessened by the concurrence of the two Houses of parliament."" 7
174. This argument appears in the Massachusetts's House of Representatives' answer to
Governor Hutchinson's address in Reid, ed, Briefs at 66 (cited in note 148). Professor
Reid notes in his introduction to the section that the argument was probably written by
John Adams.
175. The argument that allegiance was to the natural person of the king was supported
by reference to Calvin's Case. See note 169. The implication further followed from the
claim made by some that the king's lands in America were his alone and his rights to
them had not been granted to the British state. Reid, ed, Briefs at 121-22 (cited in note

148).
176. Wilson, Considerations on the ... Legislative Authority at 744-45 (cited in note
154).
177. 4 The Works of John Adams 154, cited by Black, Constitution of Empire at 119497 (cited in note 169).
A number of American whigs nonetheless argued that the king had a duty to keep
Parliament out of colonial affairs. Reid, ed, Briefs at 42 n 9, 72 (cited in note 148);
Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America, in Julian P. Boyd,
ed, 1 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 121-37 (Princeton, 1950).
In his speech to the Massachusetts General Assembly, Governor Hutchinson argued
that the colonists had, in fact, recognized William and Mary, whose succession to the
throne had been based on an act of Parliament and who themselves swore to govern
according to the statutes of Parliament. The Massachusetts House claimed in response that
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But if some of the specific historical and constitutional arguments were
problematic, 78 they were motivated by a very real constitutional threat. For the
colonists, political freedom had depended on preserving a proper balance between a realm of central and a realm of local power; Parliamentary policies,
however, both challenged the division of power, and the balance, that had
existed between central and local institutions. The very necessity on the part of
colonists to articulate a precise boundary between central and local authority
itself indicated the breakdown of the balance; and in the face of a Parliament
that showed little indication of being concerned with preserving such a balance,
the colonists increasingly despaired of finding any principle short of complete
autonomy on the basis of which they could defend a meaningful realm of selfgovernment. "The more I have thought and read on the subject," Benjamin
Franklin wrote as early as 1768, "the more I find myself confirmed in the
opinion that no middle ground can well be maintained. I mean not clearly with
intelligible arguments. Something might be made of either of the extremes: that
Parliament has a power to make all laws for us, or that it has a power to make
no laws for US." 79 In the eyes of many colonists, Parliamentary policies, pursued under the former of these principles, were destroying the realm of colonial
self-government and instituting in its place a government of the center, with the
disparagement of rights and liberties that comes from being governed by the will
of another. What was at stake, then, in the choice between Franklin's "extremes"
was the very existence of genuine representative government and colonial
political freedom: the freedom of the colonists to act on their own political
judgments, and to protect liberties in accordance with their own collective
conception of the common good.
By the early 1770s, many colonists had come to share the view that no
federalist "middle principle" would be both sufficiently strong and sufficiently
1

the king's oath was to govern according to the Statutes of Parliament and the "Laws and
Customs of the Same," including (it was argued) the right to "freely debate and consent
to such Statutes as are made by themselves or their chosen Representative." On this view,

William's and Mary's oath to govern under Parliamentary statutes was also an oath to
govern the colonies through their own assemblies. Reid, ed, Briefs at 140 (cited in note
148) (emphasis in original). According to Professor Reid, this rejoinder "appears to be the

work of John Adams." Id at 119.
178. For defenses of the colonial view by modern scholars, see McIlwain, American

Revolution (cited in note 169); and generally Black, Constitution of Empire 124 U Pa L
Rev 1157 (cited in note 169). For a well-known criticism of McIlwain's views, see Robert
Schuyler, Parliament and the British Empire (Columbia, 1929).
179. Letter of Benjamin Franklin to William Franklin, March 13, 1768, in Leonard
Labaree, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of Benjamin Franklin 75-76 (Yale, 1959). See also
Wilson, Considerations on the . . . Legislative Authority at 735-39 (cited in note 154):
"[T]he writer informs, that, when he began this piece, he ....
entered . . . with a view
and expectation of being able to trace some constitutional line between those cases in

which we ought, and those in which we ought not, to acknowledge the power of
parliament over us. In the prosecution of his inquiries, he became fully convinced that
such a line does not exist; and that there can be no medium between acknowledging and
denying that power in all cases." (Emphasis in original.)
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definitive in practice to be able to serve as the basis for defending against a
Parliament that acted in the spirit of sovereignty; that there was no precise and
formal line that could distinguish a realm of colonial power and a realm of
Parliamentary power and that could maintain the balance between them; and
that against a Parliament that acted under the principle of sovereignty, the only
viable response was a claim of complete colonial autonomy from Parliamentary
regulations. From the colonial perspective, such a claim did not, of course, imply
a claim of independence from the empire-though from the perspective of a
Parliament that claimed to be the sovereign power in the empire as a whole, it
could imply nothing less.
D
In discussing the constitutional fears and the constitutional claims of colonists in the decade or so leading up to the Revolution, I have noted some of the
continuities with the constitutionalist arguments made by the parliamentarians in
the conflict between the Houses and the king in the seventeenth century. The
most central common issue in these two sets of conflicts concerned the proper
mediation between considerations of "government" (as it was put in the seventeenth century) and the property and liberty of subjects; like the seventeenth
century parliamentarians, the eighteenth-century colonists argued that political
freedom required that the common good be determined by institutions that
adequately represented these latter interests. While this general constitutional
issue was fundamental to both conflicts, there was, however, an important
difference in the context within which the issue appeared.
The claims made by the parliamentarians were on behalf of an institution
that was commonly said to embody the whole of the nation. Parliament had
traditionally been depicted as the fullest embodiment of the whole kingdom'
and as we have seen, it had become common (again) in the sixteenth century to
refer to Parliament in such terms as the "great corporation or body politic of the
kingdom."'' The issue with respect to Parliament was not, then, whether it
was the highest embodiment of the whole kingdom-even James referred to the

180. The exact meaning of that idea, changed over time, but it had definite medieval
roots. Parliament as a whole was sometimes referred to as the embodiment of the whole
kingdom as, for example, when Edward I pledged that no new aids or taxes would be
imposed but by "common assent of the whole kingdom and for the common benefit of
the same kingdom." Confirmation of the Charters in Stephenson and Marcham, eds,
Sources of English Constitutional History 164, 164-65 (cited in note 57). In one medieval
conception, the body politic did not exist but in Parliament. It was in Parliament, on this
view, that the body politic materialized, the Lords sitting in their own right and the
commons representing "the plebs organized and combined in corporate communities," "the
'communitas communitatum,' the general body into which for the purposes of parliament
these communities are combined." William Stubbs, Constitutional History of England 212
(Clarendon, 1906). In the fourteenth century, Commons sometimes described itself as
representing every Englishman, although this was an idea that would be resisted for several
centuries. Morgan, Inventing the People at 48 (cited in note 120).
181. See note 68 and accompanying text.
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members of Commons as "you who are presently assembled to represent the
body of this whole kingdom"'s -but rather what kinds of decisions should be
made by that institution that embodied the whole. And the eventual establishment of parliamentary supremacy answered that question in the idea that the
institution that was the highest and fullest representation of the whole of the
nation or the people was, for that reason, sovereign.
The conflict between the colonies and England was, however, of a different
sort. As we have seen, the idea of political authority had always been a complex
one for the colonists. While political authority was partly understood to come
from the consent of the governed, the colonists well accepted that their authority,
at least in part, had been granted from above and through their charters. And
while they held that authority over certain matters now irrevocably resided
within themselves, the relationship between local authority and the authority of
the center remained necessarily somewhat indefinite. Until the conflict pressed
colonial advocates to increasingly extreme conclusions about the constitutional
relationship between the center and colonies, colonists did not deny that they
were "but parts of a whole,"' 83 and that, as such, they were subject to the
"Authority of the Parliament ... to model the Trade of the whole Empire"" 4
and their laws were subject to the review of the Privy Council. But if for some
purposes, the colonists conceded that, as parts of the whole, they were under the
authority of the center, for other purposes, they argued that authority lay, not
with the center, but with the colonial legislatures, and that the interests of the
center were represented within those legislatures themselves in the person of the
governor. From the perspective of the colonists, the issue was thus not over the
question of whether decisions of government should be made by the body that
represented the whole, for there was no single body that represented the whole
for all purposes. To the government of the empire belonged those "many things
of a more general nature ... which it is necessary should be regulated, ordered,
and governed"; while to local government belonged the authority of matters
which could not be well-represented within Parliament-the authority "to take
care of it's [sic] interests, and provide for it's peace and internal government."'8 5 Parliament's view in the mid-eighteenth century was, of course, that
it represented the whole and did so in all respects and for all purposes. In the
conflict between Parliament and the colonies, then, the point that had well been
assumed in the seventeenth-century contest between Parliament and the king was
precisely at issue; namely, whether the whole was fully embodied within any
particular institution.
While the struggle of the Houses' to limit the prerogative and the struggle of

182. Speech of James I on a Union with Scotland, in Tanner, ed, Constitutional
Documents of James I 24, 24 (cited in note 42).
183. Dickinson, Letters From a Farmer at 312 (cited in note 132).

184. Petition of the General Assembly of the Colony of New York to the House of
Commons, in Greene, ed, Colonies to Nation at 37 (cited in note 131).
185. Stephen Hopkins, The Rights of Colonies Examined (1765), reprinted in Bailyn, ed,

1 Pamphlets 507, 512 (cited in note 128).
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the colonists against the incursions of central power proceeded under a set of
common general premises about the relationship between representation and
political freedom, the institutional characters of the two conflicts were thus quite
different. And the particular institutional character of each of these conflicts
significantly affected the constitutional order that arose out of it. The eventual
result of the conflict between Parliament and the prerogative power was the
sovereignty of that particular institution that had already been understood to
embody the whole. The American Revolution, however, was explicitly fought in
the name of "the people" itself; and unlike in Britain, where popular sovereignty
arose with (or as we might even say, in) parliamentary sovereignty, in the
American case, "the people" was proclaimed sovereign independently of, and
antecedently to, its attachment to any particular institutional form. The American revolution, then, opened, rather than settled, the question of the relationship
between this people in whom sovereignty resided and particular institutions of
government. If it was "the people" itself that was sovereign, and sovereign
antecedent to any particular institution, the question precisely raised by American independence was how was that sovereignty was to be realized.
It was certainly possible that the new states could have adopted the Parliamentary model and proclaimed that sovereignty now lay in the assemblies or
provisional congresses as the highest embodiment of the people. But they did not
do so. And that they did not was likely a consequence, at least in significant
measure, of the fact that for the colonists neither "the people" nor "sovereignty"
had ever been easily incorporated into a single institution. Indeed, the greatest
threat to political freedom-from the perspective of the colonists-had come
precisely from an institution that claimed to embody all the subjects of the
empire: The constitutional charters that emerged from this history thus understandably resisted the notion that "the people" was reducible to a particular
institution and struggled with the problem of how a sovereign people was to be
represented by political institutions in which "the people" was not fully contained.
III
Let us return now to the events with which we began. As noted earlier, in
May of 1776 the Continental Congress, in what amounted to a kind of preliminary declaration of independence, called for the withdrawal of allegiance from
the crown and for the enactment of new charters on the authority of the people.
The particular response to this resolution varied somewhat by colony. South
Carolina and New Hampshire had already adopted charters in accordance with
earlier Congressional recommendations; however, these charters were clearly
provisional and meant to be in effect only during the course of hostilities, and
they were replaced with revised charters in 1778 and 1784, respectively. In the
charter colonies of Connecticut and Rhode Island, where day-to-day "government sufficient to the exigencies of their affairs" had already been independent
of the direct involvement of the crown, the assemblies simply declared that the
government now existed on the authority of the people rather than the king. In
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Virginia, work began on a charter shortly after the provincial congress instructed
its delegates to the Continental Congress to vote for independence, and a charter
was adopted in the final days of June." 6 New Jersey passed its charter on July
2, the day on which Richard Henry Lee's resolution of independence was
adopted. The remaining seven colonies enacted their first independent charters
after Congress's formal declaration of independence; in each colony but that of
Massachusetts within the following year. (In Massachusetts, proposed drafts of
a constitutional charter led to widespread public debate about the proper nature
of a constitutive assembly and of a constitution; and after popular rejections of
several proposed charters, Massachusetts finally adopted a constitutional charter
in 1780.)
One of the notable features of the charters enacted after the May resolution
is that, excluding the exceptional cases of Connecticut and Rhode Island and
including the revised charters of South Carolina and New Hampshire, each contained some listing of fundamental liberties, either within the body of the
document or as a separate bill of rights.' 7 It is this feature of the charters on
which I shall want to concentrate, and in a moment I shall turn to these declarations of rights. But before doing so, it is worth focussing very briefly on an initial
question that was raised by the proposal to write new charters of government
and that posed quite starkly a question of the relationship between the sovereign
people and particular institutions of government; namely, who was to write these
charters?
The constitutional charters enacted before the passage of the Declaration of
Independence (the charters of Connecticut, Rhode Island, Virginia, New Jersey
and the provisional charters of South Carolina and New Hampshire) were each
written by existing assemblies or provisional congresses. However, for each of
the charters written after the Declaration (including the revised charters of South
Carolina and New Hampshire) the new states adopted the procedure of holding
special elections to choose the body that would be responsible for writing the
charter.'88 With the exception of Massachusetts's and New Hampshire's revised

186. Adams, First American Constitutions at 72-73 (cited in note 12).

187. Delaware's declaration of rights was added later by statute, although it is referred
to by the constitutional act. Because it was added by statute, it has not been included in
most of the standard reprints. It is reprinted in 2 American Archives 286-87 (5th series).
On Delaware's Bill of Rights, see Max Farrand, 3 The Delaware Bill of Rights of 1776

641-50, American Historical Review (1897-98).
188. In Delaware and Pennsylvania, special conventions were called for the purpose of
enacting a charter, although the conventions engaged in some ordinary legislative work as
well. In Maryland, North Carolina, Georgia, New York and South Carolina (in the case
of its revised charter), the constitutional charters were enacted through regular assemblies
and congresses, but only after a special election had been held with the understanding that
the elected representatives would be charged with writing constitutional charters. In
Massachusetts, after a long debate on the issue, it was decided that the charter would be
drafted by the house of representatives, after a special election, and then submitted to the
towns for comment and approval. Adams, First American Constitutions at 68-93 (cited in
note 12). The revised charter of New Hampshire was enacted through a convention after
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charter, these charters were not submitted directly to voters for ratification.
Nonetheless, despite some opposition,189 there seems to have been a widespread
belief that a charter that was to be grounded on the right of the people to
institute new government should be written by representatives especially chosen
for that task.'90 As a committee of New York's provisional congress put it in
recommending new elections: "The right of framing, creating, or remodelling
Civil Government is and ought to be in the People.... As the present form of
Government by Congress and Committees in this Colony originated from, so it
depends on, the free and uncontrolled choice of the inhabitants thereof."' 9 '
Now, at first glance, and for we who are accustomed to special procedures
for writing or amending constitutions, the idea that the body charged with
writing a new charter should be specially elected for that purpose may hardly
seem a striking proposition. But on deeper thought, the idea behind such a
procedure is not obvious at all; and, indeed, it certainly seemed a significant

point to many at the time. 92 Why, after all, should the writing of a new constitutional charter have required new elections? It may be tempting to say simply
that such a procedure was grounded on the idea of popular sovereignty: that the
charter was meant to come from "the people." But to leave it at this would be
to siy both too much and too little. If it is meant to imply that constitutional
charters could only be enacted by a vote of "the people" directly, it says too
much; for as we have noted, most states did not even submit the completed
charters to the electorate for ratification. On the other hand, if the power of the
people to create a new forni of government could be exercised through an
ordinary legislative assembly,' why was there a need to elect new assemblies?
The new assemblies were in some cases elected on a different basis than the
sitting assemblies, but they were not, on the whole, obviously either more or less
representative than the old. Elected assemblies certainly did, and do, routinely
decide issues for which they have not been specifically elected, and this is not
normally thought to present a problem for democratic governance. And under
the theory of Parliamentary sovereignty as it developed within Great Britain, a
sitting Parliament might change the constitution without announcing in advance
its intentions to do so and without calling a special election. Why, then, were
these sitting representative bodies in the new American states, to whom the

earlier drafts had been submitted to town meetings for approval or amendment. Poore, ed,
2 Federal and State Constitutions at 1280 (cited in note 18).
189. Adams, First American Constitutions at 75-79 (cited in note 12).
190. In some cases, the calling of a special convention to draft a constitution was used
as a method of overcoming opposition within existing assemblies to the enactment of a
new constitution. Nonetheless, the arguments for holding a special election or convention
were made in terms of the propriety of such a procedure and seem to have been received
with a great deal of support. See Adams, First American Constitutions at 72-86 (cited in
note 12).
191. Quoted by Adams, First American Constitutions at 84 (cited in note 12).
192. See Adams, First American Constitutions at 72-86 (cited in note 12).
193. I shall use the term "assembly" here in a generic sense that includes provisional
congresses and constitutional conventions.
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everyday business of government was entrusted, not appropriate for the purposes
of drafting a constitutional charter?
The thought that they were not appropriate and that a constitutional charter
should be written by a body specially elected for that purpose is significant and
it reflects an appreciation of the problem of the relationship between "the
people," on whose behalf these charters were to be written, and "representative"
assemblies. Indeed, in a sense, this issue presented in a new form the question of
the relationship between what we earlier referred to as "top-down" and "bottom-up" authority. For on the one hand, the authority of the constitutions came
upwards from the people: it was the people and not their existing governments
that had the right to "institute new government, laying its foundation on such
principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their safety and happiness." On the other hand, the constitutional
charters and the new forms of government that they were to bring into being
were necessarily to be formulated by an existing and pre-constitutional body and
it was for this body to determine how the people itself would, in the future, be
represented and governed. 94 If governmental power flowed from the people
upwards, in a very real sense it also flowed from the government down.
The particular analogy need not be pushed too far. But the colonists, as we
have seen, had always held a complex view of the relationship between "the
people" and political institutions and it is not surprising that in the waking moments of independence and in the context of the question of who should write
the foundational charter of government, the question of the relationship between
existing assemblies and "the people" should be immediately raised. The idea that
the assemblies charged with writing charters should be specially elected for that
purpose did not imply that existing assemblies were corrupt or unrepresentative.
It seems rather to have come out of a recognition that even "representative"
assemblies are imperfectly representative and that even an assembly elected by
"the people" is not identical with that people, but is a particular and partial
embodiment of it.
Of course, if representative institutions are imperfectly representative, it must
follow that even the assemblies elected for the purpose of drafting a constitution
would not be identical with the people. The idea of holding special elections
may, indeed, have been partly symbolic: at a moment of political independence

194. Even in Massachusetts where the charter was submitted to the people, some body
had to decide how voting should take place, how proposals from the towns and counties
should be considered and so forth. In fact, in the spirit of popular sovereignty, it was left
to local communities to decide how they would respond to the proposed charter of 1780.
The result was that some communities ended up voting on the entire document, others on
each individual provisions and others returned their votes with various qualifications. The
difficulties in interpreting the results for the charter as a whole were so great that in the
end the constitutional convention simply declared that the charter had passed. See Oscar
Handlin and Mary Handlin, The PopularSources of PoliticalAuthority: Documents on the
Massachusetts Convention of 1780 25 (Harvard, 1966). A similar situation occurred in the
adoption of the revised New Hampshire charter of 1784. See Poore, ed, 2 Federal and
State Constitutions at 1280 (cited in note 18).
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founded on the sovereignty of the people, it may be quite natural and desirable
to signify the idea of popular sovereignty by providing for some form of direct
public participation in the process by which the constitutional charter is brought
into being. But in addition to whatever symbolic significance there may have
been to holding special elections, there was another evident motivation for
adopting such a procedure-namely, to create assemblies that were simply more
representative of the people for the particularpurpose of writing a constitutional
charter. The goal of having special elections would thus be to produce a body
that would be better representative of the constitutionalconcerns of the people,
for the members of these new assemblies would be chosen in large measure
specifically on the basis of constitutional considerations. This rationale for
holding special elections may, again, seem quite obvious, and yet the distinction
between ordinary representation and "constitutional" representation suggests an
important constitutionalist idea; it suggests that "the people" has a constitutional
identity or character that may be better or worse represented within even elected
and "representative" governmental institutions.
The question of precisely what it means to say that "the people" has such a
constitutional identity was obviously not developed in this context, and the
particular context did not require a fully-developed answer. Nonetheless, the
notion that a special form of election is necessary for the body charged with
writing a constitutional charter entails not only the significant idea that, in a
system founded on popular sovereignty, the relationship between "the people"
and particular institutional representations of the people is itself at issue, but also, more specifically, that the nature of that relationship is a particularly important question where fundamental or "constitutional" concerns are at stake.
The concern with the problem of how to represent "the sovereign people"
within institutions that did not fully embody it was thus present in the very
election of new assemblies to write the charters. It was also well reflected within
the charters themselves. And nowhere is this more evident than in their declarations of rights.
Earlier, after emphasizing the fact that the declarations of right in these
charters were attached to constitutions that were acts of political sovereignty, I
asked the question of how we should understand the relationship between
political sovereignty and these declarations of rights. That question has, however,
two components. The first is the question of the relationship between political
sovereignty and the rights to which these declarations refer. The second, which
is a quite different question, is about the point of declaring those rights.
The essence of the colonists' constitutional claim against the center had been
that, for certain matters, the question of the common good, and of how rights
and liberties were to be accommodated to it, could properly be determined only
by local institutions. The colonists had often used constitutional language in
asserting the protection of property, specific liberties and the like against parliamentary regulations; but the foundations of the constitutional claim were
collective and institutional, and the constitutional arguments were almost always
put explicitly in those terms. The argument, for example, was not that property
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could not be taken, but that it could not be taken unless the owner "shall in
person or by his Representative, think fit to part with the whole or any portion
of it."' 95 Similarly, the complaints about the quartering of troops, the use of
admiralty courts, the closing of harbors, and so forth were not that such measures would be, on any occasion and for any reason unjust, but rather that such
policies were being imposed unjustly by a Parliament that did not genuinely
represent colonial interests. The claim of right, that is, was not a claim of absolute protection against governmental interference (although there were certainly
thought to be some things that no just government would under normal circumstances do), but a claim against "arbitrary" governmental interference.
The establishment of sovereign states on the authority of "the people" meant
that the determination of the common good, and of the accommodation of rights
and liberties to it, was to be made, in all cases, from within. In this sense,
sovereignty itself was the grandest of all rights, for it included the right to adjust
all other rights in the name of the public good. And the new charters were, in
their entirety, thus attempts to give effect to this grandest of all rights. Indeed,
given the significance of this right, and the history from which these charters
grew, it is perhaps not surprising that in many of the state charters, we should
find this right articulated explicitly. The expression of this general right is most
clear in those charters in which the declaration of rights appears at the beginning
and forms a kind of general manifesto on the principle of just government.
Virginia's declaration of rights, for example, after stating the natural and inalienable rights of all men to "the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means
of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and
safety," asserts that "all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the
people," that "government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit,
protection, and security of the people, nation, or community," and that "all men,
having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with, and attachment
to, the community, have the right of suffrage, and cannot be deprived of their
property for public uses, without their own consent, or that of their representatives so elected, nor bound by any law to which they have not, in like manner,
assented, for the public good." 196 Statements to the effect that an individuals'
property can be taken, and their liberty restrained, only by their consent or the
consent of their representatives can be found as well in the charters of Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland, Connecticut and
1

North Carolina.

97

195. From the Town of Boston's List of Infringements and Violations of Rights (1772),

reprinted in Greene, ed, Colonies to Nation 179, 179 (cited in note 131).
196. Va Const of 1776, Bill of Rights SS 1-3, 6 (superseded 1830).
197. The declarations of rights in the charters of Pennsylvania, New Hampshire (in its
revised charter of 1784), Delaware and Massachusetts follow the basic structure of
Virginia's. They each begin with an assertion of natural rights and a declaration that all
power resided in the people, and each then goes on to declare that property may be taken
and liberty constrained only by the consent of individuals or their representatives. See Pa
Const of 1776 Declaration of Rights, Art I, Ill-VIII (superseded 1790); NH Const of
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This, however, now takes us to the second part of our general question. For
the issue that is naturally raised is this: if the point of the charters was to protect
this grand right by creating a representative system of government and one in
which the interests in "life ...liberty ...

property ... happiness and safety"

would be properly considered in the determination of the common good, what
was the point of declaring, not only this grand right, but more importantly, a set
of other, more specific "rights"? Many of the specific rights articulated in these
charters were, to be sure, among those felt by the colonists to have been violated
by the central government during the years prior to the Revolution, and if there
were to be a listing of rights, we would well expect that these would be included.
But if the idea was not that these interests were absolute, but rather that they
had been harmed unjustly by a government that had not properly represented
colonial interests, why was there thought to be a need to proclaim specific rights
at all against these new governments, whose power came from the people and
which were meant to represent the people? And what was the connection between these governmental bodies that were established to represent the people
and this declaring of rights?
We can get a sense of how these declarations were meant to stand towards
government and the role they were meant to play from the language in which
they were written, a language that is immediately striking to the modern reader.
In setting up the structure of governmental institutions, the state constitutional
charters tend to speak in the imperative. "The legislative," it is said, "shall be
formed of two distinct branches";19 "a quorum of the house of representatives
"the senate and house of representatives
shall consist of two thirds ...;'"
shall each choose their respective officers by ballot"; z"' "the president of the

1784, Bill of Rights, Art I-HI, XII (superseded 1792); Del Const of 1776, Bill of Rights
5§ 1, 6, 10 (superseded 1831); Mass Const of 1780, Declaration of Rights, Art I, X. The
Declaration of Rights of Maryland begins with the assertion that all rightful government
originates from the people and goes on to declare that the "right of the people to participate in the Legislature, is the best security of liberty, and the foundation of all free
government." Md Const of 1776, Declaration of Rights, Art I, V (superseded 1851).
Connecticut's charter, after proclaiming that the people of the state "have the sole and
exclusive Right of governing themselves," holds that "no Man's Life shall be taken away:
No Man's Honor or good Name shall be stained: No Man's Person shall be arrested,
restrained, banished, dismembered, nor any Ways punished: No Man shall be deprived of
his Wife or Children: No Man's Goods or Estate shall be taken away from him, nor any
Ways indamaged under the Color of Law, or Countenance of Authority; unless clearly
warranted by the Laws of this State." Ct Const of 1776, Preamble, Par 1-2 (superseded
1818). North Carolina's Declaration of Rights begins with the assertion that all political
power is vested in the people and proceeds to declare that no freeman's property, liberty
or privileges ought to be taken but by the law of the land and that "the people of this
State ought not to be taxed, or made subject to the payment of any impost or duty,
without the consent of themselves, or their Representatives in Assembly, freely given." NC
Const of 1776, Declaration of Rights, Art I, XII, XVI (superseded 1868).
198. See Va Const of 1776 S 4 (superseded 1830).
199. See Pa Const of 1776 §10 (superseded 1790).
200. See SC Const of 1778, Art XVIII (superseded 1790).
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executive council, in the absence or sickness of the governor, shall exercise all the
powers of the governor" ;21 and so on. In contrast, however, the language of
rights and liberties in these constitutions is less that of command and more that
of general principle and is admonitory or conditional. To take just a few examples, the Virginia Bill of Rights says, not that excessive bail shall not be required,
but that it "ought not to be required"; 212 that "in suits between man and man,
the ancient trial by jury is preferable to any other and ought to be held sacred"; 2 3 not that the freedom of the press shall not be abridged, but that "the
freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and can never be
restrained but by despotick governments." 2 4 Pennsylvania's Declaration of
Rights says that no "man, who acknowledges the being of a God [can] be justly
deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of his religious
sentiments"; 211 that "the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of
writing, and publishing their sentiments" and that "therefore the freedom of the
press ought not to be restrained."2 6 The Maryland Declaration of Rights holds
that "sanguinary laws ought to be avoided, as far as is consistent with the safety
of the state"; 217 the Georgia constitution that all "persons whatever shall have
the free exercise of their religion ... provided it be not repugnant to the peace
and safety of the state" ;28 and the Delaware Bill of Rights that "trial by jury ... is one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties, and estates of the
people,"2 9 that "retrospective laws ... are oppressive and unjust, and ought
not to be made,"2"' and that "for redress of grievances, and for amending and
2
strengthening the laws, the Legislature ought to be frequently convened." '
And similar language can be found in the declarations of rights of North Carolina, Massachusetts and the revised constitution of New Hampshire.2"2
The admonitory and conditional language of these declarations of rights does
not, of course, imply that the principles articulated were regarded as less important or less "constitutional" than the structural provisions of the charters.
Certainly when these constitutions declare, for example, that "the freedom of the
press ought not to be restrained," just as when they declare, as most of them do,
that elections for the legislature "ought to be free," they are not merely expressing a foggy hope. The principles expressed in these charters were meant to be
taken quite seriously, and the intention was that government should act with

201. Ga Const of 1777, Art XXIX (superseded 1789).
202. Va Const of 1776, Bill of Rights 5 9 (superseded 1830).
203. Id at 5 11.
204. Id at 5 12.
205. Pa Const of 1776, Declaration of Rights, Art II (superseded 1790).
206. Id at Art XII.
207. Md Const of 1776, Declaration of Rights, Art XIV (superseded 1851).
208. Ga Const of 1777, Art LVI (superseded 1789).
209. Del Const of 1776, Bill of Rights S 13 (superseded 1831).
210. Id 11.
211. Id 5 8.
212. NC Const of 1776, Declaration of Rights (superseded 1868); Mass Const of 1780,
Declaration of Rights; NH Const of 1784, Bill of Rights (superseded 1792).
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them firmly in mind. And yet the form of the provisions needs to be appreciated.
It was not that there was no other language available for articulating rights and
liberties, and-these constitutions occasionally do speak of the protection of rights
and liberties in the imperative; in fact, there are two of these first constitutional
charters, New York's and New Jersey's (as well as South Carolina's revised
charter 13) which consistently do so.2" 4 The language in which most of these
declarations were written was rather a reflection of what those declarations of
rights were meant to be and what they were meant to do. These declarations of
rights were not, on the whole, conceived of as enactments of fundamental law
beyond the reach of government, but were rather articulated as principles of
government. As Edward Corwin has written, while these charters "illustrated and
realized the doctrine that all just government rests upon the consent of the
governed," "it was a corollary from this doctrine, that a government established
upon this foundation had the right to govern." Of governmental institutions, it
was "the legislative department" which was "supposed to stand nearest the
people"; and "legislative" power, as Corwin says, was "undefined power" which
"like the British Parliament and like colonial legislatures before it, exercised all
kinds of power."" '
However, we should not conclude from the idea that these declarations of
rights were not generally thought to be enforceable against the legislature by
another official agency representing "the people," that therefore the legislature

213. SC Const of 1778 (superseded 1790).
214. For example: "No acts of attainder shall be passed," NY Const of 1777, Art XLI
(superseded 1821) (emphasis added), criminal actions "shall not work a corruption of
blood," id, "the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed . . . ," id at Art XXXVIII,
"there shall be no establishment of any one religious sect.. . " NJ Const of 1776, Art
XIX (superseded 1844) (emphases added).
It may be relevant that of the first constitutions, New York's and New York's
alone, provided a state body with the power to declare laws unconstitutional, and it may
be that the more legalistic language of the New York constitution is attributable in part
to the existence of such an institution. However, it should be said that the criteria of the
council of revision was broad: to determine whether the laws were "inconsistent with the
spirit of this constitution, or with the public good," and its decision could be overturned
by a two-thirds majority of each House. NY Const of 1777, Art HI (superseded 1821).
In these ways, the power of the council (which was composed of the governor, the
chancellor and the justices of the supreme courts, or any two justices and the governor)
was as much like the veto power of a modem executive as it was like the power of a
modem court.
Pennsylvania's constitution established a council of censors, but it had no direct
power to hold a law unconstitutional. It did, however, have power to censure, to impeach,

to recommend to the legislature repealing laws that seemed to the council to be contrary
to the principles of the constitution, and to call for a convention to revise the constitution. (It is notable that under the Pennsylvania Constitution one response to a law that
was thought to violate the constitution was to change the constitution.)

215. Edward Corwin, Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review, in
Richard Loss, ed, 2 Corwin on the Constitution: The Judiciary 91, 105 (Comell, 1987)

(emphasis in original).
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was thought to be a perfect embodiment of the people. It is certainly true that of
all the agencies of government, the legislature was that body that tended to be
most closely identified with the people. But as we have already noted in discussing the enactment of these constitutional charters, the understanding of the
relationship between the legislature and the people was not a simple one. And,
indeed, most of these early charters divided power in a bicameral legislature,
which suggests that even with respect to the legislative branch, the drafters did
not adopt a simple view of the relationship between the people and representative institutions. (In the successive waves of constitution-making that followed
this earliest period, the tendency was to move yet further towards a balanced
constitutional separation of powers and yet further away from the identification
of the legislature with the people.) Similarly, these declarations of rights, while
they were not, on the whole, meant to establish legally enforceable claims against
the government, represent very clearly a recognition of the distinction between
the people and representative institutions. Such declarations, indeed, necessarily
imply that there is at least potentially a difference between "the people" and the
representation of "the people" in the legislature, for if "the people" was perfectly
embodied in the legislature, the legislature could never fail to represent the
people's fundamental interests, and it is precisely because of the possibility that
the legislature could violate or neglect fundamental principles of the people that
it was thought necessary to specify those principles in a written declaration of
rights. In fact, after these constitutional charters were enacted, a number of
citizen movements protested certain legislative decisions on the grounds that they
violated fundamental rights of the people. In so doing, these movements thus
claimed to represent rights of the people against the government; and the form
of the claim was that the government had failed to give proper due to those
rights. As one antifederalist writer would later note in the debate over the need
for a bill of rights in the federal constitution: "we [that is, the people] have
found by experience the great advantage of a Bill of Rights in our State Constitutions; when the legislature passed sundry laws infringing on the Bill of Rights, we
had it in black and white to show them they were wrong; and to their honour be
it spoken, they have repealed one; and so far as the necessities of the people
would admit the other."2" 6 Although the appeals of "we," the people, needed
to be directed at the legislature, for just this reason, it is clear that "the people"
was not fully identified with the legislature.
Some historians have tended to see in these declarations of rights a kind of
groping towards judicially enforceable legal rights.2" 7 But whatever one might

216. Essay by A (New Hampshire) Farmer, (New Hampshire) Freeman's Oracle and
New Hampshire Advertiser, 11 January 1788, in Herbert J. Storing, ed, 4 The Complete
Anti-Federalist 206 (Chicago, 1981) (emphasis added).
217. Even Gordon Wood and Bernard Bailyn (exhibiting in this respect a different sort
of whiggishness) have tended to see these early expressions of right as an immature stage
in the development of the idea of a constitution as a fundamental law on the Marshallian
model. See Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 273-82
(Norton, 1972); Bailyn, Ideological Origins at 184-198, especially 189-90 (cited in note
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think about their efficacy, these declarations are quite intelligible on their own
terms, not as enactments of determinate fundamental law (or proto-fundamental
law) and also not (as it has sometimes been put) merely as "moral" principles.
What they represented, quite simply, were constitutionalprinciples. And the idea
of declaring these principles as part of a constitutional charter founded on the
authority of the people, and as part of the same charter that also created
particular governmental institutions to represent "the people," is, again, quite
significant and quite understandable given the history from which these constitutions emerged.
We have discussed the traditional English constitutional concern for the
existence of institutions that would properly mediate between interests of
"government" and the liberty and property of subjects, a concern that had been
central to the English conflicts of the seventeenth century and central to what
those conflicts came to stand for in eighteenth-century constitutional ideology.
But if in Britain, the eventual result of those conflicts was the supremacy of a
single institution that was said to embody the whole and, as such, to represent
both concerns of government and the rights and liberties of subjects, in America,
the former colonists had particular reason to be suspicious of the idea that a
single institution might adequately represent the whole. After all, for the colonists, the threat to representative government had come precisely from a Parliament that had claimed sovereignty and had claimed to represent all the subjects
of the empire; the threat of Parliamentary domination, that is, had been the
threat of an essentially foreign parliament that presumed to act as a legislature
for the subjects of the whole, but that would, in pursuing its understanding of
the good, fail to respect adequately the interests of colonists.""S While American
independence would eliminate this threat from the British Parliament, it did not
solve the general problem that colonists had learned only too well: that a "supreme" governmental body, even while claiming to be representative and even if
acting for what it took to be the general welfare, might well neglect certain
important rights" 9 and liberties. Of course, if elected bodies could be made to
represent the people perfectly, there would be no danger of this. But if no system
of representation was, or could be, perfect, the danger remained that, even
governmental bodies elected by "the people" would neglect certain kinds of
rights and liberties.
The idea, then, of declaring certain rights and liberties likely to be neglected

133).
218. In this regard it might be noted that, while the threat from Parliament was
obviously the most serious, colonists had sometimes also appealed to Parliament to redress
grievances against colonial legislatures themselves. See Greene, Peripheries and Center at
59 (cited in note 17).
219. The term "right" here is not used to refer to an absolute immunity from governmental action or a legally enforceable claim against government. We might either describe
it as a certain kind of interest or claim to which the government is an under an obligation to afford particular respect, or as a right whose particular meaning is determined
in the context of the public good overall.
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in the process of governing and doing so as part of the very charters of these
states was a quite understandable and sensible reaction. The point of declaring
such rights, however, was not thus to enact a law, but to articulate certain
aspects of the nature of the people and the state-aspects which might otherwise
tend to be poorly represented. Of course, if these principles at issue could be described both absolutely and with sufficient precision, it would be logical to do
so; to declare that the government may never do x or invade y. But the drafters
of the early state constitutions surely knew better; they knew that given the
variety of exigencies that arise in the life of a polity, it is rarely possible to
specify exactly what "the necessities of the people would admit." The idea of
declaring certain foundational constitutional principles was nonetheless to
provide a counterpoint to the tendency of governmental bodies to represent
poorly these principles, to increase the presence of these principles within political deliberation and political discourse. In declaring fundamental rights and
liberties, these charters were thus creating constitutional landmarks of sorts,
providing a common basis for "frequent recurrence to fundamental principles"
which was necessary for any "free government."22 ° While these constitutional
charters thus marked a moment of political sovereignty, at the same time, they
signaled the difference between "the people" on whose sovereignty they stood
and particular political representations of that people. And in articulating aspects
of the people's constitutional character that might tend to be lost in the ordinary
course of governing, these declarations attempted to help represent some part of
that difference.
I have thus far been focussing on the early state constitutional charters. But
these same ideas continued to echo in the debates over the inclusion of a bill of
rights in the federal constitutional charter of 1787. In proposing a stronger
national government that would assume some powers once exercised by the
states, in proposing a legislature divided between one house appointed by state
legislatures and one directly elected by voters, and in proposing a relatively
strong executive and a relatively independent judiciary, the 1787 constitutional
plan offered a yet more complex and pluralistic institutional structure for
representing "the people." 22' And in calling for special conventions to vote on

220. Va Const of 1776, Bill of Rights S15 (superseded 1830).
221. See generally Beloff, ed, The Federalist, and particularly Federalist 62 (cited in note
7). In his Lectures on Law, James Wilson expressed and expanded on many of the ideas

articulated several years earlier by the federalists, but in a language that referred far more
explicitly to the relationship between a single "people" and divided representation. After

describing the people or the state as "an artificial person or body politick," a "moral person ...united together for their common benefit," Wilson argued that it was necessary
to represent this artificial person through different government bodies with different
characters.
The house of representatives, for instance . . . diligently inquire into grievances,
arising from both men and things. . . . Their sentiments, and views, and wishes,
and even their passions, will have received a deep and recent tincture from the
sentiments, and views, and wishes and passions of their constituents. Into their
counsels, and resolutions, and measures, this tincture will be strongly transfused. . ..
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ratification of the Constitution, the constitutional plan pointed once again to the
imperfect relationship between representative institutions and "the people" on
whose authority the Constitution was to rest. By the same token, those who
opposed the plan did not, in general, do so on the grounds that it divided
representation of "the people" into various different institutions, but on the
grounds that the institutions that it established would not sufficiently represent
some part or aspect of the people-that, for example, in the new constitutional
system the "aristocratical element" or some other group would be overly represented in national institutions-and that the national institutions it established
would come to dominate state institutions, which represented the people in a
very different way.' Running through both the arguments in favor of the constitutional system and the arguments against it was thus a concern with the ways
in which national and state institutions would each represent "the people" or fail
to represent some part or aspect of the people. And a similar concern ran
through many of the arguments in favor of a bill of rights.
The issue of a bill of rights for the federal constitution was a somewhat
more complicated one than it had been in the case of the states, for partly what
was at stake was the relationship between national and state power. In response
to the argument of some federalists that a bill of rights was not needed because
the national government had only those powers expressly delegated to it, and
that the inclusion of a bill of rights might do more harm than good by falsely
implying that the government otherwise had general plenary powers, 1 supporters of a bill of rights frequently argued that a bill of right was necessary to

If, at any time, the passions or prejudices of the people should be ill directed
or too strong; and the house of representatives should meet, too highly charged
with the transfusion; it will be the business and the duty of the senate to allay the

fervour...

In fine; the senate will consider itself, and will be considered by the people,
as the balance wheel in the great machine of government...
Wilson, 1 Lectures on Law at 401-16 (cited in note 7.)
222. See Herbert J. Storing, ed, The Complete Anti-Federalist (Chicago, 1981) and
particularly the Essays of Brutus, New York Journal, October 1787-1788, in Storing, ed,
2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 358; and the Federal Farmer's Observations Leading to a
Fair Examination of the System of Government Proposed by the Late Convention; And
to Several Essential and Necessary Alterations to It. In a Number of Letters from the
Federal Farmer and An Additional Number of Letters From the Federal Farmer to the
Republican Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of Government Proposed by the
Late Convention; To Several Essential and Necessary Alterations in It; And Calculated to
Illustrate and Support the Principles And Positions Laid Down in the Preceding Letters,
January 20, 1788, in id at 214-357.
223. This argument was perhaps first made by James Wilson and was most often associated with him. See Speech in the State House Yard, Philadelphia, October 6, 1787, in
Merrill Jensen, ed, 2 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution,
(State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976) 167-68. The argument appears as well in
Federalist 84 (Hamilton) in Beloff, ed, The Federalist (cited in note 7). For other instances

of this argument by federalists, see Herbert J. Storing, ed, 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist
at 356 note 116 (cited in note 222).
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"carefully describe[] the powers parted with and powers reserved" 22 4 to the
states. The federal bill of rights was thus conceived by its advocates partly as a
clarification of the domain of delegated national power 225 and a means of
protecting states-and the particular kind of representation of the common good
that the states afforded-from encroachment by national institutions; as a means,
that is, of trying to prevent the federal government from becoming a supreme
Parliament. And this conception of a bill of rights was no doubt partly responsible for the language in which it came to be written-a language more absolutist
than that found in most of the state declarations of rights.226 But a federal bill
of rights was not only advocated as a way of protecting the power of states from
the expansion of national power. For however national power was defined and
circumscribed, the power left to the national government would be the power to
govern; and no clarification of the general powers of the national government
would eliminate the danger that in the course of governing, certain aspects of the
people, certain important rights and liberties, would not be well represented.
Indeed, if this had been a concern with regard to state governments, it was, for
227
many, far more of a concern with respect to a central government.
The conception of a bill of rights as reinforcing certain aspects of the people
against the tendency to neglect those aspects in the course of governing can be
seen in the response to one of the common arguments against the need for a bill
of rights. It was claimed by some that a bill of rights was unnecessary in a popular government because in such a system all power resided with the people. As
Alexander Hamilton, for example, argued, bills of rights were "in their origin,
stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgements of prerogative in
favour of privilege, reservations of right not surrendered to the prince. ' ' 22' The
English Bill of Rights, which was adopted in reaction to the conflicts between
Parliament and the king over the limits of the prerogative power, was meant as
an explicit statement of those limitations and thus as a support for future resistance by "the people" to a king who violated those limits. The limitations were,
however, on the prerogative power, not on the power of Parliament, for Parliament embodied the people itself. "It is evident, therefore," the argument went,

224. Storing, ed, 2 Complete Anti-Federalist at 248 (cited in note 222).
225. In this sense, a bill of rights would function something like the obverse of Article
I, Section 8, which sets out the powers of Congress.
226. For example, "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press"; "A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right
of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed"; "No soldier shall, in time
of peace, be quartered in any house," etc. United States Constitution, Amendments I-III
(emphases added).
227. Madison famously argued, however, that just the opposite was true. Federalist 10
in Beloff, ed, The Federalist at 41-8 (cited in note 7). He nonetheless also favored a
federal bill of rights, although with some reservations, and eventually came to act as its
prime advocate in the first Congress. See Letter to Jefferson, October 17, 1788 in 1 Letters and Other Writings of James Madison: 1769-1793 425-26 (Lippincott, 1867).
228. Federalist 84 (Hamilton) in Beloff, ed, The Federalist 438-39 (cited in note 7).
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"that according to their primitive signification," bills of rights "have no application to constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the people, and
executed by their immediate representatives and servants," for here "the people
surrender nothing; and as they retain everything, they have no need of particular
reservations."' In a letter to Jefferson, Madison reiterated this point that a
bill of rights, as traditionally conceived, did not seem to have application in a
popular government. In a monarchy, while the king enjoyed certain prerogative
powers, "the latent force of the nation" remained nonetheless "superior to that
of the Sovereign" and thus could be mobilized to oppose abuses of power. In
such a system, Madison noted, a "solemn charter of popular rights" served as a
"standard for trying the validity of public acts, and a signal for rousing and uniting the superior force of the community." In contrast, however, Madison wrote,
in a "popular Government, the political and physical power may be considered
as vested in the same hands, that is, in a majority of the people, and consequently, the tyrannical will of the Sovereign is not to be controuled by the dread of an
appeal to any other force within the community."" ° In such a system, then,
what purpose could a bill of rights serve?
Madison himself offered an answer to this question; or rather two answers.
First, while it is generally true, he argued, that "the danger of oppression lies in
the interested majorities of the people rather than in the usurped acts of the
Government, yet," Madison suggested, "there may be occasions on which the
evil may spring from the latter sources; and on such, a bill of rights will be a
good ground for an appeal to the sense of the community.""' When Madison
speaks here of "an appeal to the sense of the community," he does not seem to
be thinking about "rousing and uniting the superior force of the community" in
"physical" resistance; rather, he seems to be suggesting that a bill of rights might
serve as a standard by which governmental actions would be evaluated and
representatives judged within the normal processes of politics: elections, citizens'
movements and the like. 2 Madison's second answer concerned the danger that
the threat to liberty might come from the majority itself, and here he suggested
that a bill of rights might help to reinforce certain principles within the majority:
"The political truths declared in that solemn manner acquire by degrees the
character of fundamental maxims of free Government, and as they become
incorporated with the National sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and
passion." 3'
Madison was hardly sanguine about the efficacy of bills of rights in serving
these purposes; in his own Virginia, the declaration of rights had been, he

229. Id at 439.
230. Madison, Letter to Jefferson, October 17, 1788 at 425 (cited in note 227).

231. Id at 426.
232. This clearly seems to be Madison's thought in this passage, for he adds as an
additional reason that "Perhaps too there may be a certain degree of danger, that a
succession of artful and ambitious rulers, may by gradual and well-timed advances, finally
erect an independent Government on the subversion of liberty." Id.
233. Id.
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believed, too often violated by the "popular current." 234 Nonetheless, his arguments in favor of a bill of rights offered an important response to the claim that
a bill of rights had no place in a popular government. That claim had rested on
a rather simplistic view of the relationship between "the people" and its representatives, and a rather elementary conception of "the people" itself. In contrast,
Madison's arguments, to which Jefferson responded with wholehearted concurrence-the ideas were, as he put it, "acknoleged just in the moment they were
presented to my mind"E3 5-suggested a far more complex view of popular
sovereignty. If in a monarchy, the purpose of declaring rights was to help
promote the power of a popular institution against the power of the prerogative,
the purpose of a bill of rights in a popular government was, Madison was
suggesting, to secure certain important aspects of the people against other aspects
of the people. And this was necessary both because particular government
institutions may fail to represent certain fundamental aspects of the people, and
also because the majority itself, moved by "impulses of interest and passion,"
may forget certain important principles.
Indeed, in considering the early idea of a bill of rights, it is significant to
note just how little the arguments for even the federal bill of rights seemed to
depend on the existence of a system of judicial review. To be sure, the idea that
under the new constitutional system, the federal judiciary would have some
power to enforce the provisions of the constitutional charter was argued by both
advocates and opponents of the new Constitution.236 But the role of courts in

234. Id at 424.
235. Letter to Madison, March 15, 1789 in Boyd, ed, 14 Papers of Thomas Jefferson
at 659 (cited in note 176).
236. Two of the more definite descriptions of the power of judicial review were offered
by Hamilton, in Federalist 78 and the antifederalist "Brutus." Hamilton argued that a
"constitution is, in fact, and must be, regarded by the judges as a fundamental law" and
"must therefore belong to them to ascertain its meaning." Beloff, ed, The Federalist at 398
(cited in note 7). And Brutus contended that under the new Constitution, the Supreme
Court would have
the power, in the last resort, to determine all questions that may arise in the course
of legal discussion, on the meaning and construction of the constitution. . . . [If
the legislature pass laws, which, in the judgment of the court, they are not
authorised to do by the constitution, the court will not take notice of them; for it
will not be denied, that the constitution is the highest or supreme law. . . . And
the courts are vested with the supreme and uncontroulable power, to determine, in
all cases that come before them, what the constitution means; they cannot, therefore,
execute a law, which, in their judgment, opposes the constitution, unless we can
suppose they can make a superior law give way to an inferior.
Storing, ed, 2 Complete Anti-Federalist at 423 (cited in note 222). The arguments of
Brutus, however, must be read within the context of the general antifederalist view that
national institutions would essentially destroy the states as political entities; the above
argument was followed, for example, by the assertion that courts would claim as well the
power to decide all private disputes, even between citizens of the same state. Id at 424-27.
In any case, both Hamilton and Brutus are concerned here with questions concerning the
general domain of national power and particularly of the general domain of Congressional
power. Despite Hamilton's characterization of the courts as "an intermediate body between
the people and the legislature," he evidently did not think of judicial review as playing
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reviewing acts under the Constitution was conceived primarily as protecting
against the incursions of one governmental body or political entity into the
domain of another. And in the few state cases in which arguments of unconstitutionality had been asserted, the claim had generally been that one governmental
body had attempted to exercise a power that was not properly its own (as, for
example, when one house of the legislature granted a pardon which, it was
claimed, it did not have the power to grant)"7 or had attempted to violate judicial procedures that were guaranteed by the constitution (by, for example,
prohibiting courts from hearing private disputes38 or changing the size of the
jury.) 9 It may well have been assumed by some, then, that at least those provisions of a federal bill of rights dealing with judicial procedures might be
enforced by a court against legislative encroachments; and since a bill of rights
was partly conceived as a protection of state power, a bill of rights may also
have been thought to offer grounds on which a court might invalidate unconstitutional federal encroachments on state power (and vice-versa). But much of the
debate over a bill of rights proceeded quite independently of any definite conception of judicial review; in the context of these debates, there was little discussion of whether there would be judicial review or in what such a practice would
consist. When, in the letter to Jefferson I quoted earlier, Madison expressed his
pessimism about the efficacy of a bill of rights-" [r]epeated violations of these
parchment barriers have been committed by overbearing majorities in every
State" 24 -- and assumed that whatever force a bill of rights would have, it
would have on "the National sentiment," he was clearly not 'thinking of a
modern practice of judicial review.24' In his response from France, Jefferson
himself had to add that, in addition, a bill of rights might also put a "legal
check.., into the hands of the judiciary."242 The thought, however, was not
much developed by Jefferson, and he did not seem to offer it as a response to
Madison's central point about the problem of limiting majority tyranny; instead,

such a role with respect to a bill of rights.
237. See Commonwealth v Caton, 4 Call Virginia Reports 5-12 (1782), reprinted in
Bernard Schwartz, ed, 1 The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 410-416 (Chelsea
Publishers, 1971).
238. Den d. Bayard and Wife v Singleton, 1 Martin North Carolina Reports 42-44
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Jefferson responded directly to Madison's point that a bill of rights might be
ignored by offering a somewhat more optimistic view of its effect: "[Tiho it is
not absolutely efficacious under all circumstances, it is of great potency always,
and rarely inefficacious. A brace the more will often keep up the building which
243
would have fallen with that brace the less.
Even, then, as the idea of judicial review-in some form-was gaining in
currency, the idea of a bill of rights continued to be talked about, not as an
enactment of a definite law, but as a means to declare "clearly & without the aid
of sophisms" 244 certain fundamental aspects of the polity's collective political
character, a "text" of fundamental principles by which to "try all the acts of the
federal government." 245 In the light of modern constitutional practices, we may
be tempted to read these frequent allusions to the necessity of protecting against
the power of government as a reference to judicial review. But there is little
mention of courts here, and the imagined audience for the anticipated appeal to
a bill of rights seems, in general, to be the government itself and the people. And
the idea is that without such a declaration of rights, there will be nothing to
counteract the government's own representation of "the people" and nothing to
counter the natural tendency of both government and the people themselves to
neglect important principles. "Miserable indeed would be the situation of those
individual states who have not prefixed to their Constitutions a Bill of Rights,"
argued the anti-federalist John DeWitt of Massachusetts; for without such
written declarations, it is difficult to counter "that doctrine of tacit implication
which has been the favorite theme of every tyrant from the origin of all govern'
ment to the present day."246
Or as "Agrippa" put it, "In many other countries,
we find the people resisting their governours for exercising their power in an
unaccustomed mode. But for want of a bill of rights, the resistance is always by
the principles of their government."247 Declaring rights, then, is once again
understood here as a means of presenting and emphasizing certain fundamental
aspects of the people against the way in which the people might otherwise tend
to be represented by governmental bodies. In the words of the "Impartial
Examiner," without a bill of rights, "there will be no standard to resort to," no
"criterion" to counter the decisions of government; and with no alternative
grounds, there will be "no apparent object injured. '248 And as the "(Maryland)
Farmer argued, the "greater the portion of political freedom in a form of govern-
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ment, the greater necessity of a bill of rights," for "often the natural rights of an
individual are opposed to the presumed interests or heated passions of a large
majority []of democratic government" and "if these rights are not clearly and
expressly ascertained, the individual must be lost."24' And in a passage that I
earlier quoted in a different context, the New Hampshire Farmer noted the importance of a bill of rights in offering a set of principles on the basis of which
unofficial groups representing "the people," might challenge decisions made by
governmental bodies which themselves claim to represent the people: "We have
found by experience, the great advantage of a Bill of Right in our State Constitutions; when the legislature passed sundry laws infringing on the Bill of Rights, we
had it in black and white to show them they were wrong; and to their honour be
it spoken, they have repealed one; and so far as the necessities of the people
would admit the other."" s As Madison had said, in a state in which political
power is "vested in ...a majority of the people," there is no other force in the
community to which appeal can be made. But the idea in each of these passages
is that a bill of rights might nonetheless function to represent fundamental
aspects of the people to themselves. A bill of rights would thus stand as a
declaration by "the people," addressed to the people, and to their representatives, and about the people, particularly about certain aspects of their own
constitutional identity that might otherwise be neglected in the course of governing.
This conception of a bill of rights was described well in a pamphlet written
by one of the most articulate and widely read of the antifederalists,nI who
published under the name "The Federal Farmer." I shall take the liberty of
quoting it at some length.
We do not by declarations change the nature of things, or create new
truths, but we give existence, or at least establish in the minds of the
people truths and principles which they might never otherwise have
thought of, or soon forgot. If a nation means its systems, religious or political, shall have duration, it ought to recognize the leading principles of
them in the front page of every family book. What is the usefulness of a
truth in theory, unless it exists constantly in the minds of the people, and
has their assent:-we discern certain rights, as the freedom of the press,
and the trial by jury, &c. which the people of England and of America of
course believe to be sacred, and essential to their political happiness...
while the people of some other countries hear these rights mentioned with
utmost indifference;.... The reason of the difference is obvious-it is the
effect of education, a series of notions impressed upon the minds of the
people by examples, precepts and declarations. When the people of England
got together; at the time they formed Magna Carta, they did not consider
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it sufficient, that they were indisputably entitled to certain natural and
unalienable rights, not depending on silent titles, they, by a declaratory act,
expressly recognized them, and explicitly declared to all the world, that
they were entitled to enjoy those rights; they made an instrument in
writing, and enumerated those they then thought essential, or in danger,
and this wise men saw was not sufficient; and therefore, that the people
might not forget these rights, and gradually become prepared for arbitrary
government, their discerning and honest leaders caused this instrument to
be confirmed near forty times, and to be read twice a year in public places,
not that it would lose its validity without such confirmations, but to fix the
contents of it in the minds of the people, as they successively come upon
the stage .... What we have long and early understood ourselves in the
common concerns of the community, we are apt to suppose is understood
by others, and need not be expressed." 2
As an historical account of the Magna Carta, this leaves something to be desired,
but it is a splendid articulation of the idea of a constitutional declaration of
rights as understood in the early constitutional period. We see here the fear that
even in a popular government, certain aspects of the people, certain rights and
liberties, may "be soon forgot" by "representative" institutions and by the
people themselves. And we see here, once again, the hope that a declaration of
rights might act as a counterforce to the tendency to "forget these rights" and
might provide thus for that "frequent recurrence to" those "truths and principles" which is necessary for a "free government."
IV
Earlier, I discussed the conception of a written constitution that received its
most famous expression in John Marshall's opinion in Marbury and that has
come to dominate American thought about constitutional rights as well. In that
conception, a written constitution is an enacted law which represents the
"original and supreme will" of the people. Constitutional debate and adjudication is thus understood as a matter of discovering that will; and it is because-or
at least in part because-courts are institutionally and professionally most suited
to that task that courts have a special role to play in reviewing the constitutionality of acts of government." 3 In noting the obvious difficulty of such a conception of a written constitution-especially as applied to constitutional
rights-in a state grounded on the principle of popular sovereignty, I suggested
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that a certain amount of its appeal may come from accepting the claim that such
a "theory is essentially attached to a written constitution," and that rejecting that
view of a written constitution would "reduce[] to nothing what we have deemed
the greatest improvement on political institutions." I have tried to show, however, that, at least with respect to the idea of constitutional rights, the Marshallian
view is not in fact essentially attached to a written constitution; and, in examining the revolutionary American charters as a response to the problem of what it
means to found a state on the authority of the people, I have focussed on an
alternative-and, I believe, richer-conception of a written constitution of rights
and a set of constitutionalist ideas that, while never entirely lost, have also never
been sufficiently developed within our constitutional thought. In closing, let me
summarize these general ideas before saying just a few words about how taking
those ideas more seriously might matter to our constitutional discourse generally
and-to focus on that issue that has been the subject of most constitutional theorizing-to the practice of judicial review in particular.
The first of these constitutionalist ideas is, as I put it earlier, that the relationship between "the people" as a sovereign entity and any particular institutional representation of the people is always at issue, and is never fully or
definitively settled. Early constitutionalist thinkers did not develop this idea very
far theoretically, but as I have tried to suggest, a form of the idea was implicit
within the special procedures adopted for establishing new constitutional
charters, and as well in the systems of government established by the states and
by the federal Constitution of 1787, each of which divided representation of the
people into multiple institutions (in the case of the states, increasingly so in the
successive waves of constitution-making). And the idea was explicitly expressed
in the constitutional charters of a number of states, which proclaimed that "all
power is vested in ...the people" and that the "the people," therefore, possess

the right to reform the constitution in whatever "manner... shall be judged
most conducive to the public weal." 4 These constitutional charters thus quite
clearly distinguished between "the people" and the representation of the people
by particular governmental bodies, and denied that "the people" itself could ever
be fully captured within any particular political institution.
The idea that the relationship between "the people" and those governmental
bodies that are meant to represent it is an imperfect one was certainly not
entirely of American origin and, among its other intellectual creditors, it owed a
good deal to English Whig thought. But in Great Britain, Parliament came to be
regarded as the full embodiment of the political nation. Not even as staunch an
advocate of Parliamentary sovereignty as was Blackstone denied the general right
of revolution against tyrannical governments, or denied that Parliament might
fail properly to represent the nation; but this right of revolution was for
Blackstone an extra-constitutional one and involved a break between one consti-

254. These particular expressions of the idea are taken from the Va Const of 1777, Bill
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tutional order and another.5 In early American constitutional thought, however, we can see the unfolding of the remarkable idea-or perhaps we should call
it only an early movement of thought, for it was certainly not well-developed-that the dynamic tension between "the people" and the institutions that
claim to represent it might be capable of existing as a force within the constitutional order. While incipient to be sure, there is nonetheless quite early on the
presence of this notion that "the people" is not ever fully embodied within any
institutional form, and that proper representation of "the people" requires the
existence of counterpoints to the particular representation of the people that any
single institution offers.
The second idea is a particular extension of the first and concerns the notion
of declaring fundamental rights. Once again, this idea was not quite fully
developed as a theory; it was, as much as anything else, a collective impulse, an
almost instinctive reaction to a particular history. But the idea of declaring
rights, as I have tried to show, came out of the recognition that political institutions concerned with the everyday objects of government will tend to neglect
certain aspects of "the people," including certain important rights. A declaration
of rights, it was thus hoped, (and it was really, at bottom, a hope) would serve
as a marker such that "the people .. might not forget these rights," and a
mooring to which those whose rights were unjustly harmed might secure their
objections. Against the notion that the performative function of declaring rights
is to enact a law, we have here, then, a very different idea: that the function of
declaring rights is to articulate part of the fundamental character of the people
that might otherwise be poorly represented-and by so doing, to give additional
presence to that aspect of the people within the politics of the state. Declaring
certain fundamental aspects of the people that are likely to be neglected in the
ordinary course of governing was one response to the recognition that even
elected bodies constitute only imperfect and partial forms of representation; by
articulating certain fundamental principles, these declarations would-so went
the hope-help to recall and to promote at least part of what governmental
institutions were most likely and dangerously to forget.
For a number of reasons, it is not surprising that the early state constitutions
did not, on the whole, provide for systems of judicial review to protect fundamental rights." 6 Given the historical association of the colonists with their
assemblies and given the experience of colonists with certain royal courts, early
constitutional thinkers did not naturally think of the judiciary as an institution
for representing "the people" against legislatures. In the debates over the federal
constitutional charter of 1787, some federalists (most famously Hamilton) did
describe courts in the new constitutional order as, in part, serving as "an
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intermediate body between the people and the legislature." 7 However, this
view (later echoed by the opinion in Marbury) relied on the notion that the constitution, as the "will" of the people, was a "fundamental law" and that the
"[i]nterpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts."2"' The arguments for judicial review thus generally did not extend to
include judicial protection for a bill of rights; for a bill of rights was still not
conceived as a law in this sense. It was for just that reason, as we have seen, that
Hamilton himself claimed that, while bills of rights might have "application" in
a "treatise of ethics," they had none in a "constitution of government professedly
founded upon the power of the people, and executed by their immediate representatives and servants." 9 One may wonder about the ingenuousness of
Hamilton's argument; but whether or not sincerely held, the argument was one
that was obviously meant to persuade, and as such it evidences both the continuing legacy of the idea that bills of rights were general declarations of fundamental principle rather than enacted laws, and the idea that, at least with respect to
such principles, the best official representative of the people was the legislature.
If the earliest constitutionalists tended to leave their faith in the legislature as
the institution that would best protect rights and liberties, we may have more
reason to question that faith, at least with respect to certain kinds of rights and
liberties. And there may be good reason to believe that, with respect to certain
issues, courts can play an important role in articulating and representing certain
aspects of the people. However, taking seriously the constitutionalist ideas that
we have discussed here suggests a very different startingpoint for thinking about
judicial review. The dominant contemporary approach to thinking about judicial
review, after all, begins with the assumption that legislative and executive power
is prima facie legitimate and that it is only judicial review that requires special
justification; it then finds that justification in the idea of courts as interpreters of
a written constitutional charter that embodies the fundamental will of "the
people." In equating "the people" with a constitutional document, this approach
itself recognizes a distinction between "the people" and its representatives; but
it does so only at the cost of reducing the people to the form of an enacted law.
In taking this approach, we have, as it were, traded the conception that came to
dominate elsewhere of the people as embodied within a particular governing
assembly for the idea that "the people" is essentially embodied in a text. But
from the radical and fundamental insight that the "the people" can never be fully
represented by a particular institution, the theoretical project of constitutionalism
must be, not to show how the people can be embodied instead in a document,
but to consider how various institutions may alternatively represent the people,
and to ask what sorts of important considerations or principles are likely to be
poorly attended to within various institutions. And on such an understanding,
the project of a theory of judicial review in particular would be, not to show
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how we should go about excavating the meaning buried within this thing called
a constitution, but to ask what kinds of principles are likely to be neglected
within other institutions and to ask whether-and if so, how-those principles
might be better represented by courts.
To put the matter in this way, of course, is to describe the project, not to
complete it. Giving a proper answer to these questions would obviously require
consideration of a number of questions which I have not sought to address here:
questions concerning the virtues and the dangers of judicial involvement with
respect to various kinds of principles, and questions concerning the kinds of
techniques that courts have available to them in representing important principles
that other institutions may tend to neglect. This is not the space in which to develop these ideas; my principal concern here has been with the conception of a
written constitution of rights itself, not specifically with the question of judicial
review.26 But the answer to the question of what role courts should play in
articulating constitutional principles obviously depends on our understanding of
what a written constitution of rights is. As against the notion of a written
constitution of rights as the will of "the people" enacted as law, I have tried to
suggest here a different conception, one that is based in the problem of the
relationship between "the people" and the political institutions that claim to
represent it. I have tried to show the presence of this conception, although not
fully-developed, in revolutionary American constitutional thought and I have
tried to show how such a conception emerged out of a traditional concern with
the relationship between interests in "government" and the rights and liberties of
individuals, and out of the particular conflicts between England and the colonies
over the nature of political authority and over the relationship between sovereignty and political freedom. I have tried to suggest as well that this approach to
thinking about a written constitution of rights represents a considerably more
robust understanding of "the people" and a more profound contribution to the
constitutional question of the relationship between popular sovereignty and
government than that represented by the dominant model. And while I have not
meant to offer a theory of judicial review, what I have said suggests the basis
from which such a theory ought to proceed.
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